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CIVIL PROCEDURE AS A CRITICAL 
DISCUSSION 
Susan E. Provenzano and Brian N. Larson* 
This Article develops a model for analyzing legal dispute resolution systems 
as systems for argumentation. Our model meshes two theories of argument con-
ceived centuries apart: contemporary argumentation theory and classical stasis 
theory. In this Article, we apply the model to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
as a proof of concept. Specifically, the model analyzes how the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure function as a staged argumentative critical discussion designed 
to permit judge and jury to rationally resolve litigants’ differences in a reasona-
ble manner. At a high level, this critical discussion has three phases: a confronta-
tion, an (extended) opening, and a concluding phase. Those phases are the um-
brella under which discrete argumentation phases occur at points we call stases. 
Whenever litigants seek a ruling or judgment, they reach a stasis—a stopping or 
standing point for arguing procedural points of disagreement. During these sta-
ses, the parties make arguments that fall into predictable “commonplace” argu-
ment types. Taken together, these stock argument types form a taxonomy of ar-
guments for all civil cases. Our claim that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
function as a system for argumentation is novel, as is our claim that civil cases 
breed a taxonomy of argument types. These claims also mark the beginning of a 
broader project. Starting here with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we em-
bark on a journey that we expect to follow for several years (and which we hope 
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other scholars will join), exploring our model’s application across dispute reso-
lution systems and using it to make normative claims about those systems. From a 
birds-eye view, this Article also represents a short modern trek in a much longer 
journey begun by advocates in city states in and near Greece nearly 2500 years 
ago. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The American civil suit under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 has 
long been the subject of scholarly study. The legal literature has thoroughly 
treated the FRCP’s reform agenda, grounding in legal realism, trust in judicial 
discretion, and aims to reach just results on the merits.2 It has also criticized the 
Rules from multiple angles as a method of dispute resolution.3 What the litera-
ture has not addressed, however, is the Rules’ functioning on another plane: as 
a system for argumentation. 
This Article is the first to apply an argumentation-theoretic model to an 
American legal dispute resolution system.4 We have chosen the FRCP as our 
 
1  Throughout this Article, we variously use “FRCP” or “Rules” to refer to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure generally, and we use “Rule” to refer to particular provisions. 
2  See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal 
Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 98 (1989) 
[hereinafter Bone, Mapping]; Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regula-
tion of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 875, 895 (2009) [hereinafter Bone, Pleading 
Rules]; Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1067 
(1982); Simona Grossi, The Claim, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 3–5, 22 (2017); Richard Marcus, 
Confessions of a Federal “Bureaucrat”: The Possibilities of Perfecting Procedural Reform, 
35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 103, 118–19 (2007) [hereinafter Marcus, Confessions]; David Marcus, 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of Reform, 44 
GA. L. REV. 433, 445, 471, 492 (2010) [hereinafter Marcus, Legal Realism]; Richard Mar-
cus, How to Steer an Ocean Liner, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 615, 618 (2014) [hereinafter 
Marcus, How to Steer]; Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 85 Yale L.J. 914, 916 (1976); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered 
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. 
L. REV. 909, 986, 1001 (1987); Kellen Richard Funk, The Lawyers’ Code: The Transfor-
mation of American Legal Practice, 1828-1938, 43, 74 (Nov. 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Princeton University) (available at http://kellenfunk.org/wp-content/uploads/2018 
/09/Funk.Lawyers-Code.20180915.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9VV-DA4C]). 
3  See Bone, Mapping, supra note 2, at 117; Bone, Pleading Rules, supra note 2, at 908;  
Burbank, supra note 2, at 1090; Grossi, supra note 2, at 14; Marcus, Confessions, supra note  
2, at 118; Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 455; Marcus, How to Steer, supra note 2,  
at 618; Smith, supra note 2, at 946; Subrin, supra note 2, at 980; Funk, supra note 2, at 414. 
4  References in legal scholarship to argumentation theory without connecting it to any sys-
tem of dispute resolution include Kathryn Stanchi, Persuasion: An Annotated Bibliography, 
6 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 75, 80 (2009); Paul T. Wangerin, A Multidisciplinary 
Analysis of the Structure of Persuasive Arguments, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 195 
(1993) (discussing argumentation theory as a tool to “analyze the nature of persuasion and 
the structure of persuasive messages[,]” but not at the scale of the dispute). More than fifty 
20 NEV. L.J. 967 
970 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:3  
focus, but we hope to apply our model to a range of legal dispute resolution 
systems. Our model aims to determine whether such systems, in accord with 
argumentation theory, advance critically rational discussions and resolutions of 
parties’ disputes. That determination turns on several key questions: How and 
when do parties present differences of opinion to the arbiter, and conversely, 
how do they discover common ground between them? What processes help 
narrow the central matters in dispute? What processes promote the full, fair, 
and rational airing and assessment of those matters along with subsidiary issues 
that arise along the way? What parameters govern the scope and thrust of ar-
guments parties may make in these matters, and which argumentative appeals 
may they employ? And how do the rules running the system get chosen in the 
first place? 
We start with the roots and core of a philosophically and theoretically 
grounded model that conceives of a legal dispute as a critical discussion filled 
with argumentation. This characterization is fitting for the adversarial system in 
which the FRCP operates, a system that is fundamentally dialogic:5 at all stages 
of a civil suit, parties stand on opposing sides, take opposing positions, and 
craft opposing arguments, responding directly to and anticipating each other. 
The parties make these arguments to win. But the Rules want a rational argu-
mentative engagement, not a zero-sum game.6 
The Rules already offer advocates argumentative guidance in one sense, by 
licensing procedural motions tied to litigation stages, demarcating the proper 
times and proper methods for bringing contested issues to the judge. The Rules 
also tie the permissible scope of argument to procedural aims.7 But the Rules 
 
journal articles in Westlaw refer to “argumentation theory,” but most do so in passing, with-
out discussing or applying any particular theory. See, e.g., Arno R. Lodder & John Zelezni-
kow, Developing an Online Dispute Resolution Environment: Dialogue Tools and Negotia-
tion Support Systems in a Three-Step Model, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 287, 294 (2005); 
Kristen K. Robbins, Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to Validate Legal Rea-
soning, 27 VT. L. REV. 483, 490 n.39 (2003); P. Christopher Smith, The Uses of Aristotle in 
Gadamer's Recovery of Consultative Reasoning: Sunesis, Sungnômê, Epieikeia, and Sum-
bouleuesthai, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 731, 731 (2000) (making a single reference to “argu-
mentation theory”). 
5  ‘Dialogic’ here does not necessarily mean a discussion with two parties, but rather refers to 
a discussion in which each argument always involves at least two parties—plaintiff and de-
fendant or one of them and the tribunal. 
6  See infra text accompanying notes 16–41, 63–71, 73. 
7  See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 682 (2009) (setting the argumentative tar-
get for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal as whether the complaint’s well-pled facts support a “rea-
sonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged[]” without an “obvi-
ous alternative legal explanation” in order to “unlock the doors of discovery . . . .”); 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (setting the argumentative target 
on Rule 56 summary judgment motions as whether the non-moving party has raised a “genu-
ine issue of material fact” under the applicable substantive law in order to move forward to 
trial); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508–09 (1947) (setting the argumentative target for 
excluding trial preparation material from Rule 26’s scope of discovery as whether it was 
prepared “in anticipation of litigation[]” without a showing of “necessity” or that its exclu-
sion would “unduly prejudice the preparation of petitioner's case . . . .”) (now codified at 
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do not define the content of civil procedure arguments. Advocates are left to the 
substantive law and procedural precedent to forge case-specific positions, sup-
porting contentions, and responsive points. They lack guidance that carries 
across cases, trans-substantive guidance about the range and contours of per-
missible arguments.8 Scholars of the law who theorize about these arguments 
similarly lack a model to describe and normatively evaluate what advocates and 
courts do. They require a taxonomy of the same range and contours. 
Viewing the Rules as a system for argumentation, and identifying that sys-
tem’s defining features, is one step toward solving this problem. As a second 
step, we propose a taxonomy of commonplace litigation arguments that is con-
sistent with the FRCP’s goal of a rational dispute resolution system. With the 
parties and judge guided by this argumentation framework, the Rules have a 
better chance of doing what they were designed to do: providing a “good meth-
od of inquiry”9 for resolving suits on their merits. And scholars have better 
tools to assess whether the Rules meet this objective. 
Our model for civil procedure as a critical discussion relies on two theo-
ries. Part I discusses the more recent, the pragma-dialectic school of contempo-
rary argumentation theory, advanced by Professors Frans van Eemeren and Rob 
Grootendorst.10 Pragma-dialectics (PD) holds that argumentation occurs within 
a “critical discussion”: a staged, dialectical debate run under agreed-upon rules 
and designed to rationally persuade a reasonable critic.11 With PD comes a 
normative stance and a framework that we argue fits the philosophical and 
practical objectives of the FRCP. Specifically, the FRCP and PD share an es-
sential understanding of the kinds of arguments that a reasonable critic should 
find acceptable. The two also have in common the theoretical and analytical 
objectives of identifying and constructing relevant argumentative moves. 
 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)); Lind v. Schenley Indus. Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir. 1960) (ad-
dressing Rule 59 conditional new trial rulings and distinguishing the scope of arguments 
challenging the “weight of the evidence” from arguments challenging erroneous court rul-
ings, jury instructions, or attorney misconduct). 
8  “The term ‘trans-substantive’ refers to doctrine that, in form and manner of application, 
does not vary from one substantive context to the next. Trans-substantivity has long influ-
enced the design of the law of civil procedure . . . .” David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and 
the Process of American Law, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1191, 1191. 
9  Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 485 (“[T]he Federal Rules reflect a pragmatic em-
phasis on the tentative nature of a reform project, as well as the comparative importance of a 
good method of inquiry over a single normative goal for procedural reform going forward.”) 
(emphasis added). 
10  See FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN & ROB GROOTENDORST, A SYSTEMATIC THEORY OF 
ARGUMENTATION: THE PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL APPROACH vii (2004). Pragma-dialectics has 
received very little attention in American legal scholarship. It has a rich tradition in Europe-
an law and outside the field of law more generally. See infra text accompanying notes 43–
44. 
11  VAN EEMEREN & GROOTENDORST, supra note 10, at 16. 
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In Part II, we draw on the stasis12 theory of classical Greek and Roman 
rhetoric to supplement the pragma-dialectic model and to build the argumenta-
tive content in the FRCP’s critical discussion. Much as the FRCP sets junctures 
for advocates to pursue dialogic argument, classical stasis theory identifies pre-
dictable points for the parties to halt or stand still13 and advance arguments on 
diametrically opposed positions. Stasis theory supplies stock issues and sup-
porting arguments for any given legal dispute during these halting points. Alt-
hough classical rhetoric’s objective of winning at all costs and its failure to 
constrain emotional appeals14 clash with contemporary aims to reach rational 
conclusions in legal disputes, stasis theory retains theoretical and analytical 
parallels to civil litigation. These parallels provide a sound basis for developing 
what is missing in the FRCP—a taxonomy of conventional arguments for civil 
actions.15 
In Part III, we adapt and integrate these two theories to create our critical 
discussion–stasis model. Using litigated cases and representative examples, we 
 
12  Throughout this Article, we use English transliterations of the Greek terms στάσις (‘sta-
sis,’ pl. ‘stases’) and τόπος (‘topos,’ pl. ‘topoi’) to refer to the concepts we are using. JAMES 
DONNEGAN, A NEW GREEK & ENGLISH LEXICON 1102, 1104, 1212 (2d ed. 1831). We do so 
even though Cicero and Quintilian, whose versions of stasis theory are among the most so-
phisticated we discuss, see infra Part II.B, wrote in Latin, where the applicable terms were 
‘status’ and ‘topic(a/e).’ Status2, CHARLTON T. LEWIS, AN ELEMENTARY LATIN DICTIONARY 
806 (1890); Topica/topicē, id. at 862. If we were to use the cognate English words ‘status’ 
and ‘topic,’ we believe their contemporary English senses would hinder the reader’s grasp of 
how these ancient concepts differ from their everyday contemporary counterparts. We also 
use a convention preferred by some writers in philosophy: when referring to a concept, we 
use its name; when referring to the name of a concept, we use its name in single quotation 
marks; and when showing emphasis, we use italics. Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: 
Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. 
L. REV. 923, 931 n.14 (1996). So we might write: 
‘Stasis’ is the name of the key concept in stasis theory, but it is not a concept in the the-
ory of evolution. 
Of course, we use double quotation marks to show content actually quoted from an authority. 
The etymology of ‘stasis’ is unclear, but many scholars associate it either with “the position 
of a boxer in a fight . . . mean[ing] something like ‘attitude’ or ‘stance[]’ ” or with the “state 
characterized by the absence of movement . . . mean[ing] something like ‘stopping point’ or 
‘touch point.’ ” Jean H.M. Wagemans, Rhetorical Status Theory as an Institutional Frame-
work for Legal Discussions, in LEGAL ARGUMENTATION AND THE RULE OF LAW 205, 206 
(Eveline Feteris et al. eds., 2016). 
13  Ray Nadeau, Classical Systems of Stases in Greek: Hermagoras to Hermogenes, 2 
GREEK, ROMAN & BYZANTINE STUD. 51, 54 (1959); Ray Nadeau, Hermogenes’ On Stases: A 
Translation with an Introduction and Notes, 31 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS 361, 375 (1964) [here-
inafter Nadeau, Hermogenes]. 
14  See infra Part II.B.2.e. 
15  This Article is the first to use classical stasis theory to explore contemporary procedure. 
Compare Hanns Hohmann, The Dynamics of Stasis: Classical Rhetorical Theory and Mod-
ern Legal Argumentation, 34 AM. J. JURIS. 171, 171 (1989) (adapting stasis theory to con-
temporary legal argument in general), with WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL 
ARGUMENT 13 (2002) (providing a taxonomy for legal arguments unconnected to stasis theo-
ry). 
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apply the model to describe civil litigation’s structure as a critical discussion 
and to identify acceptable arguments—what we call the ‘stases,’ ‘stasis dimen-
sions,’ and ‘topoi’—in the critical discussion. We claim—tentatively at least—
that our model exhausts the range of points upon which the parties may seek 
adjudication and the types of rational argumentation that can support them. 
Although this Article advances the understanding of legal dispute resolu-
tion (and the FRCP specifically) from an argumentation-theoretic perspective, 
it does not provide all the answers. As our concluding remarks suggest, that is 
work to come—the leaves and fruits with which we hope to adorn the model as 
we apply and refine it. At present, we plan to continue assessing the FRCP with 
this model and to expand its application to other adversarial systems, generat-
ing empirical observations and normative recommendations. We also plan to 
apply the model to less strictly adversarial systems with the same assessment 
and reform goals in mind. Finally, we believe the model may shed light on im-
portant procedural debates—such as whether any principled distinction sepa-
rates questions of fact from questions of law. 
I. THE CONTEMPORARY CIVIL SUIT AND ARGUMENTATION THEORY 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938, were a reaction to 
the failures of the common-law and code-pleading systems before them.16 Ac-
cording to the FRCP drafters and reporter Charles Clark, these systems’ rigidi-
ty, formality, and technicality valued procedure at the expense of both sub-
 
16  See Bone, Mapping, supra note 2, at 78–79; Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revis-
ited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 862–63 
(2010); Grossi, supra note 2, at 3; Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 297, 307 (1938) [hereinafter Clark, Handmaid]; Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, 
at 478; Subrin, supra note 2, at 917; Charles E. Clark was professor and dean of Yale Law 
School at the time the rules were adopted and later became a judge on the Second Circuit. 
Clark, Charles Edward, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/clark-charle 
s-edward [https://perma.cc/MH6A-YF3V] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019). Common-law plead-
ing began in England after the Norman Conquest and governed pleadings before that coun-
try’s common-law courts. BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING 1, 
2, 3 (Henry W. Ballantine ed., 3d ed. 1923). Code pleading followed New York’s 1848 adop-
tion of a system of pleading that combined some elements of common-law and some of equi-
ty pleading. Id. at 1–2. The New York code was strongly influenced by one of the members 
of the commission that developed it, David Dudley Field, and is thus sometimes called the 
“Field Code.” CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 22 (2d ed. 
1947) [hereinafter CLARK, CODE PLEADING]. The result applied to suits in law and equity. 
CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra; SHIPMAN, supra, at 2; Bone, Mapping, supra note 2, at 10. 
The combination of actions at law and equity in code states was the single “civil action.” 
CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra. Many states later adopted pleading codes with the Field 
Code as their model. Id. Revising and editing a common-law pleading hornbook in 1923, 
Ballantine noted that a majority of states had already moved to code pleading, though several 
retained elements of common-law pleading. SHIPMAN, supra, at 1–2. Writing in 1947, Clark 
concluded that thirty-two states and territories had adopted code pleading, with the remain-
ing states and territories using common-law pleading or the same modified with some code 
principles. CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra, at 23. 
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stance and fair, efficient results.17 In addition, these systems encouraged advo-
cates to conceal their arguments and evidence until trial. After a lengthy pro-
cess of exchanging pleadings refining the issue under the common law, or a 
briefer exchange of pleadings under the code system, the parties proceeded to 
trial, with neither knowing what evidence the other would present.18 In reform-
ing federal civil procedure, Clark and his contemporaries wanted procedure to 
get out of the merits’ way; they were committed to a legal realist philosophy 
that “would entrench a good method of decision making.”19 Above all, the 
FRCP drafters wished procedure to be the modest “handmaid of justice”20 serv-
ing “fair and efficient elaboration and vindication of substantive rights.”21 
Here in Part I, using contemporary argumentation theory, we begin to ac-
count for the FRCP as an argumentative critical discussion that embodies the 
features its framers sought. Contemporary argumentation theory is an interdis-
ciplinary field whose members include scholars in linguistics, rhetoric, philos-
ophy, law, psychology, computer science, and artificial intelligence.22 We draw 
on the pragma-dialectics (PD) branch of argument theory because it provides a 
like-minded, well-theorized framework for constructing argumentation in the 
context of civil procedure. 
Section I.A provides a brief overview of the FRCP’s history and objec-
tives, contrasting it with earlier systems. Section I.B describes PD and its con-
ception of argument as a critical discussion and explains how civil procedure is 
 
17  See, e.g., Clark, Handmaid, supra note 16, at 310 (discussing a case thrown out on a tech-
nicality likely inscrutable to a layperson or party to the suit); Walter Wheeler Cook, State-
ments of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 417 (1921) (criticizing 
the Field Code’s impenetrable distinctions between pleading “facts constituting the cause of 
action” and improperly pleading “evidentiary facts” and “conclusions of law”); Marcus, Le-
gal Realism, supra note 2, at 473 (“Common law pleading required that the contours of the 
forms of action, not practical considerations or concerns of justice, dictate the boundaries 
and progress of suits. . . . If the plaintiff chose a writ that did not precisely match the facts at 
issue, his case would be dismissed, no matter how meritorious.”); id. at 474 (noting the writ 
system’s elevation of “ ‘real or fancied distinctions of logic’ ” over “ ‘[q]uestions of conven-
ience, even questions of substantial justice.’ ”) (quoting CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND 52 (1897)); id. at 
481 (under the Field Code, “[w]hat constituted a ‘statement of facts’ and a ‘cause of action[]’ 
. . . proved difficult questions that, in the spirit of the times, resulted in formalistic and con-
ceptualistic answers.”); id. at 484 (under the Field Code, plaintiffs “could not join the causes 
of action” because a “defendant could not invade both primary rights in the same transac-
tion.”); Subrin, supra note 2, at 973 (“For Clark, procedural history was a sort of morality 
play in which the demon, procedural technicality, keeps trying to thwart a regal substantive 
law administered by regal judges. Clark would use equity procedure to conquer the demon 
where Field had failed.”). 
18  See CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 16, at 76–77; SHIPMAN, supra note 16, at 32–34. 
19  Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 443. 
20  Clark, Handmaid, supra note 16, at 297; accord Subrin, supra note 2, at 962 (noting that 
Clark “wanted the law applied to the situation without procedural interference.”). 
21  Grossi, supra note 2, at 4. 
22  FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN ET AL., HANDBOOK OF ARGUMENTATION THEORY 29, 30, 44 
(2014). 
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a similar form of discourse. Section I.C explains how the PD critical discussion 
and the FRCP share a normative philosophy to achieve rational results with 
agreed-upon rules for dialectical confrontation. Section I.D then lays out the 
critical-discussion framework, and explains its utility for civil procedure. 
A. FRCP: The Reform and Its Objectives 
The FRCP were designed with two overriding objectives for resolving civil 
suits:23 (1) functional competence,24 and (2) facilitating discretionary judicial 
case-management decisions.25 Functional competence means assigning each 
phase of a suit the job it can best perform along the road to fair and efficient 
substantive results.26 For example, the FRCP drafters took the view that plead-
ings, as preliminary statements of parties’ positions reflecting only a sliver of 
the ultimate informational universe,27 were poorly suited to refine the issues to 
be tried28 or resolve factual questions.29 Contrast this with common-law plead-
ing, where the plaintiff had to bring her claim within one of the pre-existing 
common-law forms of action, after which the parties engaged in pleading ma-
neuvers designed in theory to sharpen the case to a single issue for the jury, but 
which in practice often resulted in purely technical dismissals.30 A claim under 
 
23  Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 485 (stating that these two “foundational princi-
ples” of Clark’s “procedural jurisprudence, themselves manifesting realist tenets, character-
ize major features of the Federal Rules.”). 
24  Id. at 458 (“The first job for the rules was functional competence.”). 
25  Bone, Mapping, supra note 2, at 98 (“[J]udicial discretion was the critical mechanism at 
work in the reformers’ pragmatic approach.”); Charles E. Clark, The Cause of Action, 82 U. 
PA. L. REV. 354, 362 (1934) (“Court procedure, to be workable . . . should be operated flexi-
bly by wise administrators exercising wide discretion.”). 
26  Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 458 (according to the legal-realist FRCP drafters, 
“[r]ules should provide useful guidance to judges as they try to resolve problems to reach the 
best results with their decisions. Rules thus should be stated in such a way that illuminates 
the functions they are supposed to serve.”). 
27  Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 183 (1957-1958) 
(lauding the functional leanness of Form 9’s negligence complaint because the pleader “may 
not know all those details. He may not know what his witnesses are going to testify.”). 
28  Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 494 (under the code pleading system, “[t]he 
pleadings had also handled the important task of issue formulation, but they were functional-
ly ill-suited for the job.”). 
29  See Clark, Handmaid, supra note 16, at 314; Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 493 
(“Pleadings, Clark insisted, did a poor job resolving cases on their factual merits.”). 
30  According to its latter-day proponents, common-law pleading “involve[d] the study of 
how to arrive at the issues of a case, the foundation of all legal investigation,” and it provid-
ed “the strictest rules of pure dialectics[,]” leading practitioners to “the true points in dispute 
. . . .” SHIPMAN, supra note 16, at 5. Clark’s characterization of this system belied its relation 
to stasis theory: 
The two great characteristics of common-law pleading were the issue-forming process and the 
system of forms of action. The parties by successive steps of affirmation or denial were expected 
eventually to reach an issue which formed the sole point to be tried in the case. Under the system 
of forms of action a party seeking judicial relief was compelled to bring his claim within the lim-
its of one of the existing forms or he was denied relief. 
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the FRCP can still be dismissed for pleading or jurisdictional defects,31 but this 
threshold claim-sorting function32 plays a far more discrete role than code and 
common-law pleading did. Instead, the FRCP drafters made discovery and 
summary judgment the primary issue formulators.33 Under Rules 16 and 26, the 
judge and the parties work together to define and narrow the contours of the 
case through an adversarial (but now slightly more cooperative) exchange of 
evidence.34 The discovery process amasses evidence that a motion for summary 
judgment may then test for issues amenable to fact-finding.35 Those issues, 
then, are determined by a judge or jury at trial. 
To facilitate the second objective, judicial discretion in case management, 
the Rules were designed to encourage the “best sort of judicial engagement 
with facts . . . .”36 “Flexible rules” demanded that judges “consider conse-
quences,” “engender[ing] more responsible decision making.”37 To this end, the 
Rules gave the judge an “active and empowered” role in shepherding the case 
via Rule 16’s pretrial conference provisions, which made the judge “less . . . a 
 
CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 16, at 12; see also discussion of stasis theory in Part II 
infra. This need for reaching the single issue at dispute in each case Clark attributed to the 
role of juries, which under the common law passed on the questions of fact; he claimed it 
was felt essential to clarify the issue so that it might not confuse these “laymen” who were 
not “trained judge[s].” CLARK, CODE PLEADING, supra note 16, at 13 (citing 3 HOLDSWORTH, 
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 639–56 (4th ed. 1935)). Nevertheless, “the merits of the contro-
versy were frequently lost in the maze of technicalities” as the system “developed, used and 
insisted upon” “[g]reat exactness and technical niceties.” A. C. Umbreit, Outline of the Law 
of Common Law Pleading, 4 MARQ. L. REV. 130, 130 (1920). Code pleading was not much 
better. Clark lamented that code pleading’s rigid and formalistic “cause of action . . . pur-
ported to offer ‘a mathematically exact test which . . . dispense[d] with brains upon the part 
of the judge . . . .’ ” Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 482 (quoting Charles E. Clark, 
The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 831 (1924)). 
31  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). 
32  See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL & JOANNA C. SCHWARTZ, CIVIL PROCEDURE 385 (10th ed. 2019) 
(describing the FRCP’s pleading function as a baseline mechanism for sorting strong and 
weak claims). 
33  See Grossi, supra note 2, at 25 (“Discovery on the inchoate claim could either broaden or 
narrow the specific claim to be litigated.”); Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 493 
(noting that the FRCP’s more limited role for pleadings yielded to “broad discovery, an in-
vigorated summary judgment mechanism, and flexible pre-trial case management powers 
vested in the district judge.”). 
34  Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 494 (noting that Rule 16’s scheduling order, and 
pretrial conference, and pretrial order provisions were the “superior mechanism for issue 
formulation.”); see also id. at 493 (stating that “Rules 8 and 16, the discovery rules, and Rule 
56 were ‘complements,’ organized around the principle of functional competence . . . .”). 
35  Grossi, supra note 2, at 16 (noting that “summary judgment was expected to be the prima-
ry pre-trial vehicle for framing and challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of a 
claim.”); Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 494 (“As for summary judgment, Clark 
believed it a better tool to test the legal and factual sufficiency of a party’s case . . . .”). 
36  Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 443. 
37  Id. at 458. 
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bystander and more . . . an administrator . . . .”38 Likewise, the Rules’ “detailed 
treatment of discovery” showed “the multitude of ways to best shepherd a case 
through an evidence-gathering stage.”39 Together, the Rules’ functional and 
discretionary characteristics aimed to produce the “good method of inquiry”40 
that trumped all other goals of procedural reform.41 
This carefully constructed functional phasing, guided by the judge’s discre-
tion, has important implications for considering the FRCP as a system for ar-
gumentation: it means that the parties’ opportunities for argument are not per-
petually ongoing, they are not automatic, and they are highly circumscribed. 
Argumentative opportunities arise at set times when the Rules and the judge 
permit the parties to advance their positions on claims and defenses and to seek 
procedural and dispositive rulings—but only on matters corresponding to the 
case’s current functional phase. Any theory used to analyze the FRCP’s argu-
mentative functions must account for these constraints. The theory most suited 
to that task is contemporary PD. 
B. Pragma-Dialectics: Argument as a Critical Discussion 
Also known as the ‘Amsterdam School of Argument,’ PD has achieved in-
ternational prominence in argumentation theory over the last forty years, hav-
ing been applied in a variety of argumentation domains, including legal, politi-
cal, medical, and academic discourse.42 PD has been applied to legal 
argumentation, but generally only by scholars in Europe, and then only to judi-
 
38  Id. at 499; see also id. at 473 (explaining, in contrast, how the writ system “nullified judi-
cial control over case management because it placed the power to formulate issues in the 
parties’ hands.”); id. at 494 (“For Clark, the judge, working with the parties during or after 
discovery, could better handle the task” of issue formulation and keeping the focus on the 
case’s merits). 
39  Id. at 501. 
40  Id. at 485. 
41  Id. at 447 (characterizing “functional competence and good method as key planks in [the 
realists’] positive program.”). 
42  VAN EEMEREN ET AL., supra note 22, at 581–86. 
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cial opinions.43 The PD model has received little attention in American legal 
scholarship.44 
PD views argument as a dialogical or dialectical activity, and specifically 
as a critical discussion where a party puts forward a standpoint that the other 
party subjects to critical evaluation. In PD parlance, a ‘critical discussion’ is “a 
verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of 
the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of proposi-
tions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint.”45 The 
goal is rational persuasion, not deductive validity.46 The critical-discussion 
framework is unique because it evaluates this argumentation from a single per-
spective that is both normative and descriptive. The normative aspect requires 
the parties to agree on rules conducive to solving their differences of opinion.47 
 
43  Leading scholars in this area are Professors Eveline Feteris, Harm Kloosterhuis, and José 
Plug. Their work has included discussion of “pragmatic argumentation” in opinions where 
courts justify their decisions. Eveline Feteris, Prototypical Argumentative Patterns in a Le-
gal Context: The Role of Pragmatic Argumentation in the Justification of Judicial Decisions, 
30 ARGUMENTATION 61, 62 (2016) [hereinafter Feteris, Patterns]; Harm Kloosterhuis, Re-
constructing Complex Analogy Argumentation in Judicial Decisions: A Pragma-Dialectical 
Perspective, 19 ARGUMENTATION 471, 472 (2005) (identifying and reconstructing arguments 
from legal analogy in court opinions); José Plug, Indicators of Obiter Dicta: A Pragma-
Dialectical Analysis of Textual Clues for the Reconstruction of Legal Argumentation, 8 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 189, 190 (2000) (studying textual clues for obiter dictum). 
For the relationship of PD to other theories of legal argumentation, see EVELINE T. FETERIS, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION: A SURVEY OF THEORIES ON THE JUSTIFICATION 
OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS 192 (2d ed. 2017). 
44  The scant legal scholarship addressing PD includes William Twining, Narrative and Gen-
eralizations in Argumentation About Questions of Fact, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 351, 356 n.27 
(1999) (citing FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN & ROB GROOTENDORST, ARGUMENTATION, 
COMMUNICATION, AND FALLACIES: A PRAGMA-DIALECTICAL PERSPECTIVE (1992) in support 
of Twinning’s claims about philosophical nature of generalizations); Douglas N. Walton, A 
Pragmatic Model of Legal Disputation, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 711, 718 (1998) (citing 
FRANS VAN EEMEREN & ROB GROOTENDORST, SPEECH ACTS IN ARGUMENTATIVE DISCUSSIONS 
(1984) for rules of a critical discussion in legal argumentation). 
45  VAN EEMEREN & GROOTENDORST, supra note 10, at 1 (emphasis added). 
46  See TRUDY GOVIER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARGUMENT 45–46 (John Hoaglund ed., 1999); 
VAN EEMEREN ET AL., supra note 22, at 17, 34. The use of ‘rational’ in this non-deductive 
sense is not universally accepted. Compare GOVIER, supra, at 125 (“While we often think of 
rationality in terms of conformity to universally applicable principles or rules, which can 
themselves be justified by appeals to further such principles or rules, such an understanding 
of rationality produces rather well-known philosophical problems.”), with Chaim Perelman, 
The Rational and the Reasonable, 10 PHILOSOPHIC EXCHANGE 29, 29 (1979) (“The rational 
corresponds to mathematical reason . . . which grasps necessary relations, which knows a 
priori certain self-evident and immutable truths, which is at the same time individual and 
universal . . . .”). Govier seeks cogent arguments: “[a]n argument is cogent if an only if: (1) 
its premises are acceptable to the audience to whom the argument is addressed; and (2) its 
premises are relevant to its conclusion; and (3) its premises, considered together, offer suffi-
cient or adequate grounds for its conclusion.” GOVIER, supra, at 108. 
47  VAN EEMEREN & GROOTENDORST, supra note 10, at 18. 
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The descriptive aspect requires empirical data to establish what those agreed-
upon rules are.48 
A suit under the FRCP, a system founded on conduct-based rules, rationali-
ty, and pragmatic logic,49 is precisely this type of discourse. A suit’s verbal, so-
cial, and rational activity consists of the parties’ adversarial moves—primarily 
pleadings and motions.50 These moves and their resolutions by the judge are 
also verbal, and they are predominantly written. The moves are driven by litiga-
tion standpoints—conclusions for or against that a party argues.51 And the rea-
sonable critics evaluating this discourse in a civil suit are the standpoint’s op-
ponent and the judge, jury, or both. In the next three sections, we contend that 
the PD critical discussion framework begins—but does not end—the work of 
reconstructing a civil suit’s argumentative dimensions on three essential levels: 
philosophical,52 theoretical, and analytical.53 
C. Shared Philosophy: Critical-Discussion Framework and FRCP 
Just as the essence of PD is the rational critic judging acceptable arguments 
reasonably,54 modern civil procedure, despite some advocates’ win-at-all-costs 
 
48  Eveline Feteris & Harm Kloosterhuis, The Analysis and Evaluation of Legal Argumenta-
tion: Approaches from Legal Theory and Argumentation Theory, 16 STUD. LOGIC, GRAMMAR 
& RHETORIC 307, 310 (2009). 
49  See Grossi, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that the FRCP are “steeped in the school of legal 
realism” and an “earth-bound philosophy” that rejected a natural law/primary rights view-
point); Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 446–50 (noting that Clark and the FRCP 
drafters were first and foremost “pragmatists” who rejected the purely deductive methods of 
classical legal science in favor of “[p]ragmatic truth”); id. at 454 (“For Clark, the philosophi-
cal consensus required for the success of a deductive method from first principles . . . no 
longer existed in American intellectual life.”); Subrin, supra note 2, at 966 (“The deductive 
reasoning of the common law was flawed, and set, defined legal categories were suspect. [In 
the FRCP], [b]alancing tests replaced attempts at categorization and definition.”). 
50  See infra Part III.B. 
51  VAN EEMEREN & GROOTENDORST, supra note 10, at 2, 18. 
52  Any model designed to explain a phenomenon must have a philosophical grounding: 
“[n]o consistent scientific practices are possible without well-conceived philosophical prin-
ciples.” Id. at 13. 
53  Pragma-dialectics discusses two more levels, empirical and practical improvement. See 
VAN EEMEREN & GROOTENDORST, supra note 10, at 27–37. They are beyond the scope of this 
Article, but in essence (and in our view) these two aspects really share a level, and the re-
searcher or practitioner may pursue either, neither, or both: In the empirical level, one may 
engage in empirical study, “describing those parts of empirical reality . . . that fall within our 
theoretical scope, and that correspond to our philosophy of reasonableness.” Id. at 27. Here, 
the researcher asks: In what ways does empirical reality, as reconstructed with the analytical 
framework, conform to the theoretical model to achieve the philosophical objective? In the 
practical level, one may make argumentation more consistent with the philosophical and 
analytical models by “attempt[ing] to improve argumentative practice . . . by teaching those 
people who take part in this practice, or will do so in the future,” id. at 32–33, and by fash-
ioning rules for the critical discussion. Id. at 35–36. 
54  See VAN EEMEREN & GROOTENDORST, supra note 10, at 1–4. For van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst to suggest that parties generally engage in argumentation rationally to convince 
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behavior, is also designed to reach a rational resolution of the parties’ differ-
ences of opinion.55 Indeed, the Rules renounce previous procedural regimes’ 
vaunted technicalities and form battles in favor of rational judging aimed at fair 
results on the merits.56 Furthermore, congruent with the FRCP, the goal of a 
critical discussion is to convince the tribunal of the acceptability of the claim, 
not its truth. In civil cases, the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard asks the 
fact-finder to reach a verdict on a more-likely-than-not basis.57 This just-over-
50%-likely approach hardly takes capital-T truth as its goal, but it nevertheless 
sets a rational standard for acceptable determinations.58 
For the critical-discussion framework and the FRCP’s philosophies to fully 
align, they must agree on a method for assessing argument acceptability. Frans 
H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst offer three such perspectives, only one 
of which is relevant to an externally regulated argument system like the FRCP: 
the critical-rationalistic perspective.59 This perspective “focuses pre-eminently 
 
a reasonable critic is perhaps optimistic. In everyday social and political life, it seems argu-
ment proponents engage in argumentation to win, often seemingly at any cost. So, too, it is 
in litigation, despite the FRCP drafters’ ideals. An effective system of procedure should 
work to curb those tendencies. 
55  See sources cited supra note 49. 
56  See supra text accompanying notes 23–41. 
57  See James Brook, Inevitable Errors: The Preponderance of the Evidence Standard in Civ-
il Litigation, 18 TULSA L.J. 79, 80–81, 89, 108 (1982) (discussing this probability-based evi-
dentiary standard in civil trials, its relationship to “truth,” its assumptions, and its flaws). 
58  We do not deny that there are emotions and biases—both explicit and implicit—that af-
fect the arguments made before civil courts and that affect the decisions of tribunals, and a 
rich critical literature has engaged with those shortcomings. See, e.g., Lucy Jewel, Neu-
rorhetoric, Race, and the Law: Toxic Neural Pathways and Healing Alternatives, 76 MD. L. 
REV. 663, 673 (2017) (discussing the power of emotional appeals); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit 
Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1142–47 (2012) (discussing implicit bias 
among factfinders). Though such shortcomings seem unavoidable in the human, social con-
text, court procedures are nevertheless designed to maximize rational, and minimize non-
rational, appeals in judicial arguments. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (excluding evidence 
when its rational probative value is outweighed by the potential for prejudice). 
59  VAN EEMEREN & GROOTENDORST, supra note 10, at 13–18. The two perspectives not dis-
cussed here are the geometric and the anthropologico-relativistic. Id. Under the geometric 
perspective, acceptable argumentation takes conclusively established premises and reasons 
deductively to conclusions; adherents of this view “try to prove their claims by showing step 
by step that these claims ultimately derive from something that is an incontrovertible certain-
ty.” Id. at 13–14. Though deductive arguments are useful—and used—in the law, the “heavy 
lifting” of legal argumentation is in less certain forms. See Brian N. Larson, Law’s Enter-
prise: Argumentation Schemes & Legal Analogy, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 697 (2019). More-
over, purely deductive arguments are but a segment of what American civil procedure would 
define as “acceptable” argument. See Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 469 (explain-
ing how the legal realist philosophy driving the FRCP rejects “deductive niceties” in favor of 
understanding of truth); Steven M. Quevedo, Comment, Formalist and Instrumentalist Legal 
Reasoning and Legal Theory, 73 CAL. L. REV. 119, 122 (1985) (noting the legal realist view 
that “logical deduction could solve very few concrete legal controversies.”); Subrin, supra 
note 2, at 1001 (discussing legal realists’ rejection of “a formalistic, oracular view of law 
that allegedly used deductive logic to decide who had what rights.”). 
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on discussion” and “encourages the systematic submission of the one party’s 
standpoints to the other party’s critical doubts.”60 It also accepts rules or exter-
nal constraints placed on arguments if they are directed at “solving the problem 
at hand.”61 Under this perspective, then, argumentation is acceptable if it “is an 
effective means of resolving a difference of opinion in accordance with discus-
sion rules acceptable to the parties involved.”62 
As a dispute resolution system, the FRCP adopts the critical-rationalistic 
perspective, viewing the lawsuit as a regulated process63 that resolves the par-
ties’ differences of opinion based on normative commitments that the parties 
share, or at least agree to be subject to.64 These commitments include a view of 
 
Under the anthropologico-relativistic perspective, argumentation is acceptable if it 
“complies with the standards that apply to the people in whose cultural community the ar-
gumentation takes place[,]” VAN EEMEREN & GROOTENDORST, supra note 10, at 14, but with-
out any particular external constraints. For them, acceptable argumentation is that which has 
“the force to persuade an audience . . . due to the beliefs that specific audience has . . . .” Id. 
at 15. With its twin focus on beliefs and persuasion, this theoretical position has been called 
“epistemo-rhetorical.” Id. at 20. Scholars of legal rhetoric and communication have exhaust-
ively explored this perspective. See LINDA L. BERGER & KATHRYN M. STANCHI, LEGAL 
PERSUASION: A RHETORICAL APPROACH TO THE SCIENCE 3 (2018); CATHERINE J. CAMERON & 
LANCE N. LONG, THE SCIENCE BEHIND THE ART OF LEGAL WRITING 101 (2015); Kenneth D. 
Chestek, Fear and Loathing in Persuasive Writing: An Empirical Study of the Effects of the 
Negativity Bias, 14 LEG. COMM. & RHETORIC: JALWD 1, 2, 6 (2017) (reporting the empirical 
study suggested by the title); Lucille A. Jewel, Old-School Rhetoric and New-School Cogni-
tive Science: The Enduring Power of Logocentric Categories, 13 LEG. COMM. & RHETORIC: 
JALWD 39, 77 (2016); Lance N. Long, Is There Any Science Behind the Art of Legal Writ-
ing?, 16 WYO. L. REV. 287, 288 (2016); Shaun B. Spencer & Adam Feldman, Words Count: 
The Empirical Relationship Between Brief Writing and Summary Judgment Success, 22 
LEGAL WRITING 61, 61–62 (2018) (reporting the empirical study suggested by the title); 
Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing with Fire: The Science of Confronting Adverse Material in Le-
gal Advocacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 381, 382 (2008). 
60  VAN EEMEREN & GROOTENDORST, supra note 10, at 16. 
61  Id. van Eemeren and Grootendorst relate this perspective to work of philosopher of sci-
ence Karl Popper. Id. at 16–17. 
62  Id. at 16. When the parties have agreed on the discussion rules, the argumentation has “in-
tersubjective validity.” Id. at 17. The argumentation further has “problem validity” if, when 
playing by those rules, it resolves differences of opinion. Id. at 16–17. 
63  See, e.g., Bone, Mapping, supra note 2, at 79 (discussing the reform emphasis on a 
“ ‘flexible’ [procedural] approach that would make it possible to tailor procedures to the re-
quirements of each case in a ‘rational’ way.”); Clark, Handmaid, supra note 16, at 299 (“The 
necessity of procedure in the sense of regularized conduct of litigation is obvious. Court tri-
als, like other matters of human conduct involving continually recurring processes, must be 
systematized.”). 
64  The Rules embody this agreement, stating that they “govern the procedure in all civil ac-
tions and proceedings in the United States district courts . . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 1. If they do 
not wish to be subject to the FRCP, plaintiffs are sometimes free to sue in state courts or oth-
er tribunals. Likewise, defendants can choose not to remove an action that would otherwise 
garner federal jurisdiction from state court. Obviously, there are statutory and constitutional 
constraints on these choices—defendants may remove cases that plaintiffs would prefer to 
keep in state court and plaintiffs can choose to sue in federal court or seek remand of re-
moved cases—so the “agreement” is not entirely within the parties’ control. See 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1441, 1446 (2018) (removal statutes); George Lieberman, A Guide to Removal Remand, 
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procedure as a flexible, pragmatic means of serving substantive law ends,65 be-
ing concerned with real-world outcomes rather than abstract notions of rights,66 
predictability and certainty calibrated to achieve individualized justice,67 accu-
rate outcomes attained with efficiency,68 and litigant autonomy balanced with 
judicial discretion.69 Professor Richard Marcus aptly terms these values and 
their manifestation in the Rules as “the Liberal Ethos of [P]rocedure.”70 This 
ethos reveals the same commitment to pragmatism, rationality, and transparen-
cy as the critical-discussion framework, manifested in several ways. 
First, this ethos maintains that no artificial barriers should prevent airing 
the argument; procedural rules should promote a full assessment of the merits 
over time.71 Second, it guards against determining the merits prematurely, 
through a process of argumentative vetting and disclosure—disclosure trans-
parent enough to prevent surprise or prejudice to a party when the time comes 
for merits decisions.72 Third, it promotes rational argumentation and decision-
making with procedural rules that are regular and predictable, but not so intri-
cate as to blind the judge to context or inhibit individualized justice.73 Fourth, 
this ethos fosters dialectic argument, guiding autonomous parties’ presentations 
to a judge empowered with discretion to move the case—and the argument—
forward toward a rational resolution.74 
 
FED. LAW., Aug. 2009, at 47–51 (discussing state and federal court jurisdiction and removal 
and remand procedures). This also squares with PD’s own view of legal argumentation “as 
specific, institutionalized forms of argumentative discussion.” Feteris & Kloosterhuis, supra 
note 48, at 322. 
65  Bone, Mapping, supra note 2, at 86, 98; Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 443, 
456–58, 462, 469. 
66  Bone, Mapping, supra note 2, at 79; Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 469, 489. 
67  Bone, Mapping, supra note 2, at 88; Subrin, supra note 2, at 948. 
68  Bone, Mapping, supra note 2, at 101; Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 471; Smith, 
supra note 2, at 916, 932. 
69  Bone, Mapping, supra note 2, at 45–46, 102; Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 
485–86. 
70  Marcus, Confessions, supra note 2, at 106; see also Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, 
at 493 (discussing how the Rules’ realism values manifested in the interrelationships among 
the rules on pleading, discovery, pretrial case management, and summary judgment); Subrin, 
supra note 2, at 923–24 (discussing how the Rules’ “equity mentality” manifested, inter alia, 
in “ease of pleading; broad joinder; expansive discovery; greater judicial power and discre-
tion; flexible remedies, [and] latitude for lawyers . . . .”). 
71  Bone, Mapping, supra note 2, at 109; Subrin, supra note 2, at 947; see also Marcus, Legal 
Realism, supra note 2, at 491–92, 496. 
72  See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
73  See Marcus, Legal Realism, supra note 2, at 462–63 (describing the Rules’ reasoning phi-
losophy as thus: “[t]he thinking necessary for solutions is problem-based and contextual and 
does not proceed in some abstract, a priori manner . . . .”); id. at 505 (“[T]he open-textured 
Federal Rules represent a significant break with the rigid and detailed procedural codes of 
Clark’s era.”). 
74  See supra notes 25–26, 33–34. There are certainly more candidates for core FRCP values. 
And the reader may have quite different philosophical commitments—a topic whose explo-
ration awaits another day. 
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At bottom, then, the critical-discussion framework and the FRCP share the 
following distinct philosophy: pointed disagreements in an argument must be 
fully aired and resolved by a critic who is reasonable, and who accepts argu-
ments that are rational, vetted through dialectical scrutiny, and made under 
agreed-upon, externally imposed rules. With a shared philosophy in hand, we 
next assess how well the critical discussion’s theoretical and analytical frame-
work operates to construct the argumentation moves in a civil suit. 
D. The Critical Discussion: A Theory of Civil-Suit Argumentation 
At a theoretical and analytical level, the critical-discussion framework 
gives “particular, well-defined content . . . to concepts that occupy a crucial 
place in argumentation . . . .”75 This framework is process oriented, with four 
critical discussion stages designed to ensure that dialectical argumentative dis-
course reaches a rational resolution. Those stages are confrontation, opening, 
argumentation, and concluding.76 
The confrontation stage is the point at which parties realize they have a dif-
ference of opinion requiring resolution.77 There are two confrontation types: 
mixed and non-mixed differences of opinion.78 In a non-mixed difference of 
opinion, the standpoint “runs up against doubt” but not contradiction.79 In other 
words, the opponent interrogates the proponent’s support for her standpoint 
without the opponent maintaining the contrary. In a mixed difference of opin-
ion, the opponent maintains the contrary of the proponent’s standpoint.80 The 
civil suit involves both confrontation types, driven by its adversarial model.81 
Under this model, the judge rarely issues rulings or orders sua sponte;82 the 
judge more typically responds to parties’ motions, which the rules designate as 
the mechanism for asking the court to make a decision.83 Many motions, espe-
cially of the administrative kind, are uncontested, or jointly submitted, and 
therefore involve a non-mixed difference of opinion interrogated solely by the 
judge.84 In those situations, the judge will probe—either privately within cham-
 
75  VAN EEMEREN & GROOTENDORST, supra note 10, at 18. 
76  Id. at 59. 
77  Id. at 60. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. at 60 n.41. 
81  For a full discussion of how the confrontation stage applies to a civil suit, see infra Part 
III.B. 
82  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f), 59(d) (providing that the judge may grant summary judg-
ment and new trials sua sponte).  
83  See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(b) (“A request for a court order must be made by motion. The mo-
tion must . . . be in writing unless made during a hearing or trial; . . . state with particularity 
the grounds for seeking the order; and . . . state the relief sought.”). 
84  See discussion of the Rivera case infra Part III.A. Our analysis of the docket there re-
vealed that, of the sixty requests parties made of the court for orders (usually in the form of 
motions), the court granted thirty-four, at least in part, and denied twenty-six. Twenty-eight 
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bers or publicly at a hearing or in a written ruling—the motion’s contentions, 
without hearing contrary standpoints.85 In contrast, a contested motion, where 
both parties speak dialectically to the judge and the judge responds, is a mixed 
difference of opinion.86 The parties also propound opposing arguments in re-
sponse to a court’s request for submissions in, for example, a pretrial order or 
in a jury instruction charging conference.87 These submissions are, by defini-
tion, mixed differences of opinion, because they contain contrary standpoints 
requested by the judge. 
After confrontation comes the opening stage, where “the parties to the dif-
ference of opinion try to find out how much relevant common ground they 
share (as to the discussion format, background knowledge, values, and so on) 
. . . to be able to determine whether [they can] . . . conduct a fruitful discus-
sion.”88 In a civil suit, this discovery of common ground recurs in every proce-
dural phase, as the Rules prescribe mechanisms for defining disputed and un-
disputed territory at each functional juncture.89 
The confrontation and opening stages are followed by the argumentation 
stage, where the parties “advance their arguments for their standpoints that are 
intended to systematically overcome the antagonist’s doubts or to refute the 
critical reactions given by the antagonist.”90 In this stage, “argumentation is not 
only advanced, but also critically evaluated.”91 Argumentation also recurs in 
every civil procedural phase—and often many times within each phase. 
But the argumentation stage of the critical discussion runs into two prob-
lems that stop it short of full theoretical and analytical congruity with civil pro-
cedure. The first problem is that the critical-discussion framework views argu-
mentation stages as linear, not recurring.92 The second is that the framework 
does not fully capture the content of civil procedure argumentation, which 
evades the framework because a critical discussion views argumentation as a 
 
of the motions granted were unopposed, as were thirteen of those denied. In many instances, 
the court granted or denied a request without permitting time for the opposing party to file an 
opposition. 
In fact, the Rules do not expressly grant the non-moving party the right to respond 
to a motion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 78 (using the discretionary “may” when referencing the 
court’s power to set an argument schedule on motions and to consider motion arguments on 
the briefs). Many local rules nevertheless do. See, e.g., D.P.R. CIV. R. 7(b) (allowing opposi-
tion to a motion within fourteen days after service of the motion by the moving party); id. 
7(c) (further allowing the moving party to respond to the non-moving party’s opposition). 
85  See, e.g., supra note 84 (discussing uncontested motions in a single case). 
86  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
87  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
88  VAN EEMEREN & GROOTENDORST, supra note 10, at 60. 
89  For a full discussion of how the opening stage applies to a civil suit, see infra Part III.B. 
90  VAN EEMEREN & GROOTENDORST, supra note 10, at 61. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. at 62 (describing the critical discussion model’s stages that “have to be passed through 
in order to arrive at a resolution,” and then presenting those stages sequentially, rather than 
recursively, even though the order may vary). 
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complex speech act.93 Speech acts serve diverse functions: they may commit 
the speaker to propositions, strive to motivate listener action, commit the 
speaker to act, or call a state of affairs into being.94 In the argument stage, the 
critical discussion’s analytical goals are to identify each discrete speech act and 
to understand its role in the argument and evaluate it.95 But this analysis neces-
sarily entails a detailed textual review, practically sentence-by-sentence, or at 
least paragraph-by-paragraph. Consequently, in the context of legal discourse, 
scholars have nearly always chosen to limit their consideration to individual 
judicial opinions rather than the parties’ argumentation directed at the judge 
throughout a lawsuit.96 Although these speech-act theoretic aspects may well 
yield other insights for legal reasoning and civil procedure, they operate at too 
minute a scale to capture civil procedure’s argumentative content. 
In the concluding stage, the parties determine whether “the protagonist’s 
standpoint is acceptable and the antagonist’s doubt must be retracted, or . . . the 
standpoint of the protagonist must be retracted.”97 This stage is not a straight 
match with the civil suit either. In a critical discussion, PD imagines this stage 
as two parties reaching an understanding about which standpoints are accepta-
ble to both and which must be retracted.98 Such a concluding stage is available 
to the litigants in a federal civil case, who are free to settle their differences of 
opinion at any time—and indeed are encouraged to do so by the Rules.99 And 
 
93  Id. at 22. The notion of speech acts should not be alien to law-trained readers. There are 
numerous instances in the law where the verbal performances of a person function as acts 
with legal consequences, such as making and accepting a contract offer, making an admis-
sion, defaming someone, etc. 
94  Based on the typology of philosopher John Searle, the advocates of pragma-dialectics 
term these speech acts ‘assertives,’ ‘directives,’ ‘commissives,’ and ‘declaratives,’ respec-
tively. Id. at 63–66. 
95  See id. at 100. 
96  See, e.g., Feteris, Patterns, supra note 43, at 70–77 (analyzing a single U.S. Supreme 
Court case); Kloosterhuis, supra note 43, at 475–82 (examining three court opinions for evi-
dence of argumentation schemes); Plug, supra note 43, at 192–202 (examining short phrases 
in a small number of court opinions for their role in marking dictum). We believe the volu-
minous content of multi-actor argumentation throughout a lawsuit is simply too daunting for 
scholars to analyze under this theory. 
97  VAN EEMEREN & GROOTENDORST, supra note 10, at 61. 
98  “The difference of opinion can only be considered to be resolved if the parties are, con-
cerning each component of the difference of opinion, in agreement.” Id. 
99  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5) (listing the facilitation of settlement as a core purpose of 
pretrial conference proceedings that take place throughout the case); id. 26(f)(2) (requiring 
the parties to consider “the possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the case” at their 
Rule 26(f) discovery planning conference); id. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) (permitting voluntary dismis-
sal without a court order by filing a “stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have 
appeared.”); see also W. Whitaker Rayner, Note, Judicial Authority in the Settlement of Fed-
eral Civil Cases, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171, 172–73 (1985) (describing how judicial par-
ticipation in settlement negotiations plays a vital role in resolving civil cases); cf. FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring court approval of settlement of certified class actions). 
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statistically, this resolution accounts for the majority of civil-suit endings.100 
But civil suits also yield resolutions borne of no agreement whatsoever,101 a 
type of conclusion not envisioned in the PD critical discussion. 
We address these theoretical and analytical incongruities in two ways. 
First, in Part II we discuss how the stasis theory of ancient Greek and Roman 
rhetoric steps in to supply the content for civil procedure’s argumentation stage. 
Although we conclude that stasis theory does not offer a complete solution, it 
does fill a content gap that the critical-discussion framework leaves open. Sec-
ond, in Part III, we construct a model that combines stasis theory and the criti-
cal-discussion framework in a way that addresses the critical discussion’s line-
arity and its cabined view of conclusions. 
II. THE CONTEMPORARY CIVIL SUIT AND CLASSICAL STASIS THEORY 
This Part shows how an adapted form of classical stasis theory generates 
content for civil procedure’s argumentation stage—the missing link in the criti-
cal-discussion framework. To begin, a brief backstory on classical stasis theory 
is in order. The theory was developed by the ancient Greeks and Romans as a 
method of “deciding what the problem to be addressed really is” in a legal dis-
pute,102 determining the questions that must be answered along the way, and 
identifying supporting arguments.103 It was conceived as a method of rhetorical 
invention, or discovering “in [any given] case, . . . the available means of per-
 
100  One study reported the settlement rate in two federal district courts in 2001–02 at “about 
67 percent, or two-thirds of terminated cases.” Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, 
What is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 
132 (2009). Some settlements, however, require the court’s approval. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(e) (requiring court approval of settled certified class actions). The Rules, local rules, and 
individual judges support alternative dispute resolution and settlement. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. 
P. 16(a)(5) (making “facilitating settlement” one purpose of the pre-trial conference); D.P.R. 
CIV. R. 83J(b) (permitting the judge to direct the parties to mediation under certain circum-
stances); Order, Rivera v. Mendéz & Compañía, 824 F. Supp. 2d 265 (D.P.R. 2011) (No. 
11–1530), ECF No. 6 (setting a “Settlement/Mediation Conference” with the judge less than 
two months after service of the suit). 
101  As explained infra Part III.B, a civil suit can conclude in many involuntary ways, the 
most notable of which are dismissals and defaults. 
102  Nadeau, Hermogenes, supra note 13, at 370, 373; Donald A. Russell, Introduction to 3 
QUINTILIAN: THE ORATOR’S EDUCATION 2, 6 (Donald A. Russell trans., 2001) [hereinafter 
QUINTILIAN]. 
103  QUINTILIAN, supra note 102, at 6–7; accord Hohmann, supra note 15, at 172. In addition 
to Quintilian’s THE ORATOR’S EDUCATION (“INSTITUTIO ORATORIO”), important and surviv-
ing Greek and Latin works describing or outlining stasis theory include the anonymous, first-
century B.C.E. RHETORICA AD HERENNIUM 33, 35 (Harry Caplan trans., 1954) [hereinafter 
HERENNIUM]; CICERO, DE INVENTIONE (H.M. Hubbell trans., 1949) [hereinafter CICERO, 
INVENTIONE]; CICERO, ON THE IDEAL ORATOR (DE ORATORE) (James M. May & Jakob Wisse 
trans., 2001) [hereinafter CICERO, ORATORE]; On Stases of the second-century C.E. Hermo-
genes of Tarsus (appearing in Nadeau, Hermogenes, supra note 13, at 389). For an indispen-
sable, comprehensive review of stasis theory among the Greeks and Romans (but sadly 
available only in Italian), see LUCIA CALBOLI MONTEFUSCO, LA DOTTRINA DEGLI “STATUS” 
NELLA RETORICA GRECA E ROMANA (1986). 
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suasion.”104 If well-schooled in stasis theory and the specifics of a legal dispute, 
a skilled rhetor could identify not only the stases but also the range of potential 
arguments supporting or opposing each one, including typical arguments 
known as ‘topoi.’105 In that sense, stasis theory gave forensic rhetors a decision 
tree to follow in narrowing issues and identifying arguments. For the deci-
sionmaker,106 the stases operated as “halts or blocks set up and standing in the 
way of the various major (or subordinate) steps in the analysis.”107 The party 
who provided the decisionmaker a “better answer to the question” succeeded in 
resolving the stasis in his favor.108 
That brings us to the stases themselves. Believed to have been set down 
first by the Greek rhetorician Hermagoras of Temnos,109 who lived in the late 
second century BCE, the stases numbered three: (1) the stasis of conjecture 
(questions of fact), (2) the stasis of definition (the legal significance attached to 
the facts), and (3) the stasis of quality (mitigating or aggravating factors affect-
ing culpability).110 Some theorists added a fourth stasis, the stasis of objection, 
which encompassed a variety of technical procedural issues.111 Theoretically, 
this issue categorization system was comprehensive: every case had to and 
could only raise these stock issues of conjecture, definition, quality, or objec-
tion.112 
Section II.A explains how the stases functioned in Greek and Roman trials, 
contrasting those affairs with modern civil litigation but identifying both pro-
ceedings’ need to anticipate conventional issues and arguments. Section II.B 
 
104  1 ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE 37 (George A. Kennedy 
trans., 2d ed. 2007). Note that in many cases when citing to ancient works, we will provide a 
page number to the edition we are using and also the standard location information that 
should work for readers using other editions. So, in the previous citation, “bk. 1, ch. 2, 
1355b, at 37” should allow a reader to find the cited text in any edition. 
105  Nadeau, Hermogenes, supra note 13, at 367, 369. 
106  For the contrast between a focus on the parties vs. a focus on the judge, compare Wage-
mans, supra note 12, at 206 (“Status theory is then to be interpreted as a typology of stand-
points that can be employed by the accused party for strategically choosing the best response 
in the given situation.”), with id. at 207 (“[S]tatus theory is to be interpreted as a typology of 
differences of opinion or as a method to ‘reduce complex disputes to one or more of their 
key points of conflict.’ ”). 
107  Nadeau, Hermogenes, supra note 13, at 373. 
108  Id. at 375. We use masculine pronouns here to reflect the historical context: the speakers 
in the ancient courts were almost exclusively men. See CHERYL GLENN, RHETORIC RETOLD: 
REGENDERING THE TRADITION FROM ANTIQUITY THROUGH THE RENAISSANCE ix (1997). For a 
discussion of the role of women in classical rhetorical contexts, see id. 
109  Nadeau, Hermogenes, supra note 13, at 370. Secondary Greek and Latin sources recon-
structed Hermagoras’ system; his original handbook on the topic is lost to time. Id. at 370 
n.55. 
110  For a comprehensive history, explaining which stases appeared in which systems and 
under which names, see id. at 373–81. 
111  See id. 
112  See CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, at 23 (“There will always be one of these is-
sues applicable to every kind of case; for where none applies, there can be no controversy.”); 
Hohmann, supra note 15, at 178 (supporting the comprehensiveness of this list). 
20 NEV. L.J. 967 
988 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:3  
takes a deep dive into stasis theory in its fullest form as articulated by Roman 
thinkers, showing that it is an analytically rich source of trans-substantive ar-
gument content but suffers from theoretical fluidity and lacks the rational un-
dergirding of civil procedure. Section II.C considers Professor Hanns 
Hohmann’s adaptation of stasis theory to contemporary legal argument. His ad-
aptation solves the theoretical fluidity problem, but it too stops short of a philo-
sophical match. We resolve these problems with our model in Part III, which 
adapts stasis theory and integrates it into the critical-discussion framework. 
A. Stasis Theory as a System of Argument and Dispute Resolution 
The classical stases functioned the same way in ancient Greek and Roman 
trials no matter what type of claim was involved.113 In all cases, the starting 
point was the legal accusation and response: a party (which we will call ‘the 
prosecution’) charged the accused with a legal wrong, and the accused an-
swered the charge.114 Together, the charge and response resulted in a stasis—a 
question reflecting a pointed disagreement and requiring resolution to move 
forward or decide the case.115 Notably, generalized questions such as ‘is the ac-
cused guilty’ or ‘is the accused liable’ were not true stases; the stasis had to be 
precise, a question pinpointing a contested line of defense.116 
The initial stasis kicked off a standard progression for analyzing and re-
solving the case: conjecture, then definition, quality, and finally, procedure.117 
The order makes analytical sense. The basic facts are the starting point: wheth-
 
113  Hohmann, supra note 15, at 176. Hohmann called stasis theory a “systematization of pat-
terns of possible arguments,” distinguishing this from the choice of how to express argu-
ments and from the procedural order of consideration or making of the arguments. Id. at 193; 
see also id. at 183 n.46 (“This is not necessarily to be understood as a matter of actual tem-
poral sequence, but rather as a matter of systematic sequence.”). 
114  Nadeau, Hermogenes, supra note 13, at 374; see also Hohmann, supra note 15, at 178 
(referring to the origin of stasis theory as the Greek criminal trial). 
115  Nadeau, Hermogenes, supra note 13, at 375 (noting all theorists agree that a stasis “takes 
the form of a question which focuses the contrary views of proponents and opponents” but 
some disagreed as to when the stasis actually arises). 
116  Quintilian explained that positions lacking specificity cannot create a true “stasis” be-
cause they do not crystallize the point for decision. As an example, Quintilian distinguished 
the non-specific accusation and response, “You killed him” and “I did so justifiably” vs. 
“Horatius committed a crime, because he killed his sister” and “He did not commit a crime, 
because it was his duty to kill a woman who was mourning for the death of an enemy.” 
QUINTILIAN, supra note 102, at 87. The latter leads to the following stasis of quality: “Is it 
just to kill a woman who mourns an enemy?” 
117  Cicero makes clear that this progression does not necessarily reflect the actual arrange-
ment of the speech: “[I]n every case it will be proper for both sides to consider by whom and 
through whom and how and at what time it is fitting that action be brought or judgment giv-
en or any decision made about this case.” CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 2.60–61, at 
223–25; accord id., 1.19-20, at 41; see also QUINTILIAN, supra note 102, 3.6.12–13, at 53–55 
(explaining that the stasis of greatest analytical importance to the case “is the first thing to be 
considered, but not necessarily the first thing to be said.”). 
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er the act happened and was committed by the accused.118 Consider a case of 
theft. If the property was simply lost, or if someone else took the property, then 
there is no legal dispute at all, the stasis of conjecture favors the accused, and 
the analysis ends. If the accused did take the property, then a potentially illegal 
act has happened, and the analysis moves to the next step, the stasis of defini-
tion, where the law is applied to determine the act’s essential legal character.119 
If, say, the evidence shows the accused was merely protecting the owner’s 
property rather than stealing it, then the act was not theft. It was lawful, and the 
stasis of definition favors the accused, terminating the analysis.120 But as in 
contemporary times, even if an act met the definition of a legal wrong in the 
ancient world, it did not necessarily mean legal culpability. So the accused 
could still raise the stasis of quality in a variety of ways, mitigating the legal 
effect of his conduct.121 If these circumstances fit prevailing norms and conven-
tions for avoiding legal culpability, then the stasis of quality would favor the 
accused, and the case would be resolved there.122 
The FRCP bear a functional trans-substantive resemblance to this system, 
but the Greek and Roman cases in which stasis theory operated were far more 
streamlined. Claims and issues were narrowed during limited proceedings 
shortly before trial, at which the parties (or their patrons) had brief, structured 
opportunities to speak—a one-shot chance to argue the dispute.123 In these oral 
performances, with the evidence already submitted, ancient Greek and Roman 
 
118  Throughout this Article we use the word ‘act,’ but legal disputes, and thus the stases, ap-
ply equally to events, persons, and objects. Hohmann, supra note 15, at 180. 
119  CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 1.8.11, at 23; “[T]he controversy about definition 
arises when there is agreement as to the fact and the question is by what word that which has 
been done is to be described . . . the deed appears differently to different people.” Cicero us-
es the example of stealing a sacred article from a private home—is it theft or sacrilege? Id. at 
25. To resolve the question, “it will be necessary to define both theft and sacrilege, and to 
show by one’s own description that the act in dispute should be called by a different name 
from that used by the opponents.” Id. 
120  See Nadeau, Hermogenes, supra note 13, at 375 for this basic pattern. 
121  CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 1.12, at 25 (framing issues of quality as those 
where “there is both agreement as to what has been done and certainty as to how the act 
should be defined, but there is a question nevertheless about how important it is or of what 
kind, or in general about its quality . . . ?”); Nadeau, Hermogenes, supra note 13, at 375. 
122  See Nadeau, Hermogenes, supra note 13, at 375 for this basic pattern. For those subscrib-
ing to the four-stasis structure, ending with the stasis of objection, issues of procedure would 
be raised here. The rationale for putting the stasis of objection at the analytical back end 
seems to have been the notion that procedure was something of a last resort. See QUINTILIAN, 
supra note 102, 3.6.83–85, at 91 (explaining that if the first three stases fail, “the last (and 
now the only) hope of safety lies in escaping by some helpful device of law from a charge 
which can neither be denied nor defended, in such a way as to make it seem that the legal 
action is not justifiable,” a reference to the stasis of objection, which Quintilian calls trans-
ference). 
123  Anton-Hermann Chroust, Legal Profession in Ancient Athens, 29 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
339, 343–50 (1954) (cases in Athens); see also GEORGE A. KENNEDY, A NEW HISTORY OF 
CLASSICAL RHETORIC 15–16 (1994) (cases in Athens). See generally O.F. ROBINSON, THE 
SOURCES OF ROMAN LAW (1997) (cases in Rome). 
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rhetors used the stases to sequence their affirmative positions, attacks, and de-
fensive responses on merits and procedural questions.124 In contrast, our civil 
litigation system offers multiple occasions for the parties to argue merits and 
procedure, typically in writing, and almost always without a trial.125 And if a 
case goes to trial, witness examinations, rather than speeches, drive the pro-
ceedings.126 Thus, the issues and arguments presented in diverse ways over 
months or years in today’s civil cases were usually presented over a day or two 
in Greek and Roman cases, anchored by the parties’ oral performances.127 
These structural differences aside, civil procedure does have ‘stases,’ or de-
fined points at which the parties crystallize advocacy positions and pinpoint is-
sues for the court to decide.128 And these decision points mirror, at least in a 
basic sense, the ancient stasis types, as civil cases are regularly argued and dis-
posed of on grounds of fact, definition, quality, and procedure.129 But in civil 
litigation, the decision points do not follow the ancient analytical sequence of 
the stases, and some stases (e.g., definition) arise more often than others (e.g., 
conjecture), since civil litigation is a process of gradually expanding the uni-
verse of information while narrowing what is at stake and leaving the ultimate 
facts for the jury to decide.130 
Any model that uses stasis theory to fill civil procedural argument content 
must account for these differences. And it must examine theoretical and norma-
tive compatibility as well. The sections that follow take on these tasks. 
 
124  See Nadeau, Hermogenes, supra note 13, at 383–84. 
125  See the discussion of motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, infra text accompa-
nying notes 257–61, 277–82. 
126  See, e.g., Transcript of Trial Record, Rivera v. Méndez & Compañía, 988 F. Supp. 2d 
174 (D.P.R. 2013) (Civ. No. 11-1530-BJM), ECF Nos. 210–12. 
127  For the twelve-month periods ending in September 2014–September 2019, the median 
time from filing to disposition in federal court civil cases ranged from 8.3 months to 10.8 
months. U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS–COMBINED CIVIL & CRIMINAL FEDERAL COURT 
MANAGEMENT STATISTICS data tbl. National Judicial Caseload Profile (2019). In contrast, 
after brief preliminary proceedings, ancient Greek and Roman cases went directly to trial, 
which consisted of reading testimony and hearing the parties’ court speeches. See ROBERT J. 
BONNER, LAWYERS AND LITIGANTS IN ANCIENT ATHENS: THE GENESIS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 55–56 (1927) (describing the typical Athenian court case as reading aloud the 
parties’ pleadings and witness testimony that was already “in the hands of the clerk,” fol-
lowed by the parties’ (or their representatives’) argumentative speeches, and concluding with 
the jury’s secret ballot vote after the speeches’ conclusions); Ernest Metzger, An Outline of 
Roman Civil Procedure, 9 ROMAN LEGAL TRADITION 1, 8–9 (2013) (describing Roman trial 
procedure as a preliminary hearing to isolate the issues followed by a trial that was “con-
ducted according to . . . the rhetorical conventions cultivated by the orators who spoke on 
behalf of the litigants.”). 
128  See supra Part I.A. 
129  See infra Part III.C, D. 
130  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8, 12, 26, 39, 43, 49, 52, 54, 56 (setting up civil litigation to 
proceed from assessing the sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations, to collecting evidence 
through discovery, to testing the evidence’s basic sufficiency on summary judgment, to the 
trial phase where a full evidentiary record is developed and assessed by the judge or jury 
rendering a verdict, followed by the court’s entry of judgment). 
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B. Stasis Theory’s Trans-Substantive Issues and Arguments 
Building on the original Greek model, early in the first century BCE the 
ancient Romans entered the stasis discussion.131 In our view, these Roman 
thinkers offer by far the most developed and sophisticated account of stasis 
theory, and that is why we focus on them here. Foremost among them were one 
anonymous and two towering Roman figures. First came the writer of the Rhe-
torica ad Herennium (c. 80 BCE), a text that remains the oldest extant Latin 
work on rhetoric and the oldest extant work on stasis theory.132 Second was 
Cicero, writing as a youth in De Inventione (87 BCE)133 and then again in the 
twilight of his career in De Oratore (55 BCE).134 Finally, Quintilian joined the 
ranks of elite stasis theorists with his Institutio Oratoria (95 CE).135 
All three writers eyed the stases with the same objective as the Greeks: as a 
method of invention and a means of locating the central points of the adjudica-
tion along with commonplace arguments.136 But each writer had different audi-
ences and agendas, each of which shaped the content and direction of the theo-
 
131  A later Greek scholar and teacher, Hermogenes of Tarsus (second century C.E.), wrote 
extensively about stasis in his school manual On Stases, in a manner consistent with Her-
magoras’ theory. Nadeau, Hermogenes, supra note 13, at 363, 381–82 (On Stases “rel[ies] 
heavily on Hermagoras”). However, because Hermogenes did not himself theorize about the 
topic, this Article does not discuss him beyond this footnote. Id. at 366 (On Stases “deals 
mainly with the mechanical intricacies of the ‘division’ of the stases (issues in modern par-
lance) rather than with basic theory . . . .”). 
132  See HERENNIUM, supra note 103, at vii. Originally thought to be written by Cicero, the 
book has long since been attributed to an unknown Roman Ciceronian contemporary. Id. at 
ix, xiv. But like many Roman rhetorical works, it relies heavily on its Greek forebears. Id. at 
xv. 
133  See CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, at viii. This youthful effort, whose name re-
veals its invention orientation, is a contemporaneous, less complete rhetorical treatise than 
Rhetorica ad Herennium but bears substantive and terminological similarities to it. Id. at vii– 
viii. Aimed at practitioners rather than students, De Inventione reads as a “Practical Pleader’s 
Guide,” or lawbook concentrating on invention. Id. at ix. 
134  See CICERO, ORATORE, supra note 103, at 9. Cicero revisited stasis theory in De Oratore 
at a time when he was trading public life as an orator and statesman for an existence of quiet 
study. Id. De Oratore is an ambitious work that expounded on the entire endeavor of oratory, 
presented in a dialogue format unusual for its time. Id. at 3–4. Its aim was primarily ethical, 
visualizing the ideal orator as a moral guide of the state. Id. at 11. Still, De Oratore blended 
philosophy with technique, taking up Aristotle’s laboring oar. See id. at 31. 
135  When he published Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian was writing in a political culture far 
removed from Cicero’s Roman Republic. LAURENT PERNOT, RHETORIC IN ANTIQUITY 128–34 
(W.E. Higgins trans., 2005). Indeed, Cicero’s execution is said to have ushered in the Roman 
Empire, under which public oratory all but died; for a brilliant mind with well-developed 
rhetorical theories, it was no doubt safer to expound them in pedagogical rather than political 
terms. See id. at 129–34, 142–51, 156–57, 159–63. Quintilian did just that, titling his exhaus-
tive twelve-volume work “the education of the orator.” Id. at 159. 
136  These were vital functions, on which “[t]he entire hope of victory and the entire method 
of persuasion rest . . . .” HERENNIUM, supra note 103, 1.17-18, at 31–33; see also 
QUINTILIAN, supra note 102, 7.3.15, at 225 (noting the need to “persuade the judge” on each 
stasis until he assents to one side or the other). 
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ry.137 The sections below synthesize these texts in an effort to capture a unified 
stasis theory while acknowledging individual differences. As we will see, the 
Romans progressively developed the theory, adding subdivisions to the stases 
and identifying commonplace supporting arguments. These developments at 
once reveal stasis theory’s strengths and shortcomings for constructing civil 
procedure’s argumentation stage content. 
1. Stasis Subdivisions: Well-Theorized but Fluid and Blurred 
On the precise number of stases, all three writers concurred on the essential 
three: (1) conjecture, (2) definition, and (3) quality.138 The stasis of objection 
assumed lesser importance in the Rhetorica ad Herennium139 and De Ora-
tore.140 The theorists also agreed on these stases’ basic differentiating features, 
following the Greek doctrine that every case turns in its entirety on “what was 
done” (conjecture), “the name that should be applied” (definition), or “the 
character of the matter involved” (quality).141 All three theorists also seemed to 
view the stasis of quality, with its array of mitigating possibilities, as underthe-
orized, and consequently, the Rhetorica ad Herennium and De Inventione fur-
ther divided the stasis of quality beyond the Greeks’ exculpatory notions of ex-
cuse and justification.142 Specifically, these texts interposed two divisional 
layers that aimed to identify and define stasis-of-quality subtypes with greater 
precision. 
 
137  As a pedagogical text, the Rhetorica ad Herennium centered on invention and rhetorical 
guidance for students. HERENNIUM, supra note 103, at xxxiv. In keeping with this education-
al role, its focus was on systematizing and building out the basic contours of the Greek theo-
ry. Id. at vii. Cicero’s early practical treatise, De Inventione, provided a sense of how the sta-
ses shaped legal arguments in court speeches and the trajectory of cases in ancient Rome, 
though it was less complete than Rhetorica ad Herennium. PERNOT, supra note 135, at 113. 
Thirty years later in De Oratore, Cicero made an effort to simplify the stases, eliminate arti-
ficial distinctions, and abandon rigidity. CICERO, ORATORE, supra note 103, at 34. Quintilian, 
in Institutio Oratoria, continued to build on Cicero’s theoretical foundation, and his treat-
ment of stasis theory is the most complete and sophisticated of the classical Roman theorists. 
See generally QUINTILIAN, supra note 102, 3.6, at 55–101 (emphasizing this distinction 
many times over). 
138  CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 1.10, at 21–23 (four stases); CICERO, ORATORE, 
supra note 103, 2.104, at 150 (three stases: conjecture, quality, definition); QUINTILIAN, su-
pra note 102, 3.6.66–68, at 83 (three stases: conjecture, definition, and quality). In the largest 
departure from the Greeks, the Rhetorica ad Herennium writer defined the stases as: (1) con-
jectural (2) legal (interpretation of a text, including the stases of definition and objection); 
and (3) juridical (aka quality—act admitted, but legality in question). HERENNIUM, supra 
note 103, 1.18–19, 1.24, at 35, 43. 
139  Notably, the Rhetorica ad Herennium writer points out that the technical procedural is-
sues raised in transference, such as a postponement of time or change in judges, can be ad-
dressed in a preliminary ruling. HERENNIUM, supra note 103, 1.22, at 39–41. 
140  See CICERO, ORATORE, supra note 103, 2.104–05, at 150–51. 
141  Id. 2.104, at 150. 
142  HERENNIUM, supra note 103, 1.24–25, at 43–49; CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 
2.62–110, at 225, 233, 261, 263, 265, 267, 277. 
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The first division split the stasis of quality into equitable and legal is-
sues.143 Equitable issues raised questions about “the nature of justice and right 
or the reasonableness of reward or punishment”144 based on legal understand-
ings formed outside of positive law. In contrast, legal issues were those firmly 
within the grasp of Roman civil law.145 If the sheer devotion of space to equita-
ble issues in Rhetorica ad Herennuim and De Inventione are any measure, these 
issues were far more common and had far more argumentative play in Roman 
court cases than legal issues.146 Whether absolute or assumptive, equitable is-
sues in ancient trials ultimately came down to moral arguments and lay judg-
ment.147 
Equitable issues were further divided into absolute and assumptive kinds. 
Put simply, absolute issues asked whether an act was right in and of itself ac-
cording to principles of morality or justice,148 akin to natural law. In contrast, 
assumptive issues drew on “extraneous circumstances” to exculpate the ac-
cused via the mitigating factors of justification and excuse.149 
Under this rubric, an absolute issue would ask, for example, whether it was 
“right or wrong” for one contingent of Greeks to erect a permanent memorial 
commemorating a victory over another contingent of Greeks;150 such a struc-
ture would normally be an affront to the culture. If that act was not deemed in-
herently right or wrong, the accused might raise an assumptive issue, bringing 
in extraneous mitigating proof that the conquered Greeks had started an illegal 
war.151 Another absolute or assumptive example with a more contemporary fla-
vor is the case of a performer who defames a poet on the stage.152 Social mores 
at the time might have deemed such a performance inherently right or wrong, in 
which case the issue would be absolute. If specific facts suggested that the per-
former was engaged in a satire, and if then-prevailing values excused satiric 
defamation, then the issue would be assumptive. 
These quality subdivisions deepened the theory but also exposed its fluidi-
ty. Notably, the Roman thinkers did not offer clear or principled distinctions 
between absolute and assumptive issues. With regard to the defaming perform-
 
143  CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 1.14–15, at 31. 
144  Id. 1.14, at 31. 
145  Id. 
146  E.g., HERENNIUM, supra note 103, 2.19–20, at 91–97 (law); id. 2.21–26, at 97–105 (equi-
ty); CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 2.62–68, at 225–33 (legal); id. 2.68–85, at 233–51 
(equity). 
147  According to Cicero, an equitable absolute issue “contains in itself the question of right 
and wrong, not confusedly and obscurely, as in the legal, but more clearly and obviously.” 
CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 2.69, at 233. 
148  HERENNIUM, supra note 103, 2.19, at 91. 
149  CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 2. 69–71, at 235, 237; HERENNIUM, supra note 
103, 2.21–23, at 97, 99. 
150  This example is from Cicero. CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 2.69–70, at 235. 
151  Id. 2.70, at 235. 
152  HERENNIUM, supra note 103, 1.24, at 45. 
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er, for example, what makes the issue one of inherent right or wrong (absolute) 
versus an exculpatory excuse (assumptive)?153 If both succumb to lay under-
standings of societal values, how is one to say whether that judgment turns on 
“extraneous matter” making it assumptive, or a holistic understanding of the 
situation that renders the issue “absolute”?154 
Even more important, these subdivisions of quality, when applied in many 
situations, raised nested stases of other types,155 creating categorical confusion. 
This confusion cuts against the principle that the three (or four) stases were 
self-contained with well-defined boundaries.156 Consider a defense raised by a 
soldier accused of lese majesty, the crime of flouting authority, when he aban-
doned his arms in order to save his troops.157 In this scenario, the troop-saving 
assumptive defense would raise nested issues of conjecture (did the soldier ac-
tually make this choice and why did he do it?), as well as nested issues of defi-
nition (dueling arguments about the scope of lese majesty or whether this act 
actually constitutes a different offense).158 Is the soldier’s defense then truly an 
issue of quality, or is it just a combination of conjecture and definition?159 
 
153  See Hohmann, supra note 15, at 179 (observing that “[t]hese interrelationships between 
the different levels of argumentation account for the difficulties” in trying to draw lines be-
tween the stases). 
154  Other examples of absolute and assumptive issue fluidity abound in De Inventione. See, 
e.g., CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 2.79-86, at 245–53 (in a case involving an ac-
cused’s vigilante behavior, the issue could be absolute based on inherent justice, or an as-
sumptive justification for the act); id. 2.89, at 255 (articulating defense arguments as “first, 
he will show by whose fault the event happened” (assumptive necessity) and that it “was not 
possible or obligatory for him to do what the prosecutor says he should have done,” (combi-
nation of absolute and assumptive) bringing in “principles of advantage” and “reference to 
honour.” (absolute)); see also Hohmann, supra note 15, at 178 (discussing these fluidity 
problems). 
155  See Hohmann, supra note 15, at 179 (discussing the stases, “no one term would fully ex-
haust all aspects of each level, and no one term is exclusively limited to each level.”). 
156  Indeed, this ran counter to Cicero’s purist stance: “a conjectural argument cannot at one 
and the same time and from the same point of view and under the same system of classifica-
tion be both conjectural and definitive, nor can a definitive argument be at one and the same 
time and from the same point of view and under the same system of classification both defin-
itive and translative.” (emphasis added). CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 1.14, at 29. In 
a concession to this category confusion, in De Oratore Cicero’ trimmed the stasis of quality 
down to a single level, describing it as “an appeal to justice is the basis of the defense for all 
those actions that were [a] obligatory or [b] permitted or [c] unavoidable or [d] that seem to 
have been done out of ignorance or by accident.” CICERO, ORATORE, supra note 103, 1.106, 
at 151. 
157  CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 2.72–73, at 237. 
158  Id. 
159  De Inventione discusses another scenario in which a necessity defense—also an assump-
tive issue—raises nested issues of conjecture, multiple definitions, and an absolute issue 
from the equitable prong. CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 2.98–100, at 265–67. Institu-
tio Oratoria also revealed how issues of quality could raise nested issues of conjecture and 
definition. Id. 2.99, at 265. Quintilian pointed out that when an accused defends his act on 
the grounds of his good intentions (an assumptive defense), it must be determined what his 
intentions, in fact were—an issue of conjecture. 3 QUINTILIAN, supra note 102, 7.4.26, at 
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These nested stases were not unique to the issue of quality. In like fashion, 
an issue of objection or procedure (also called ‘transference’ in Latin), could 
raise nested stases of definition and conjecture. For example, disputes over the 
proper tribunal could turn on jurisdictional facts and jurisdictional defini-
tions.160 Indeed, the stasis of definition itself could merge with other stases; af-
ter all, definitions must be applied to facts (conjecture), while mitigating and 
aggravating factors (also conjecture) can drive the applicable definition.161 Sta-
sis theory did not attempt to reconcile this nesting and blurring with its rather 
hard-and-fast conception of independent, self-contained stases, exposing fault 
lines in the theory. 
2. The Static Topoi: A Taxonomy of Commonplace Arguments with a 
Normative Problem 
The most significant Roman contribution to stasis theory—and in turn, to 
our critical discussion-stasis model—was the articulation of commonplace ar-
guments deemed both relevant and likely to succeed under each stasis. De In-
ventione touted these ‘topoi’ as lines of argument that could be “transferred to 
[]any case[].”162 Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria followed suit, theorizing the 
topoi in even greater depth.163 The topoi generally branched in three directions, 
which we will call empirical, conventional, and value based. We have adopted 
these terms,164 building on and borrowing from contemporary theorist Hanns 
Hohmann’s conception of these topoi: Empirical topoi are arguments grounded 
in observations about the world. Conventional topoi are arguments that employ 
legal conventions—that is, licenses to make certain inferences based on certain 
evidence, including presumptions and tools of construction. Value-based topoi 
are arguments that appeal to emotions or a sense of justice or fairness.165 These 
same three topoi apply to modern civil procedure argumentation. But as used 
by the ancients, the topoi reveal that stasis theory stands on a much different 
normative foundation than our procedural system. 
 
251. An accused who raises the assumptive excuse of mental incapacity must define what 
mental incapacity encompasses and show that he fits that definition. Id. 7.4.25–26, at 251; 
see also Hohmann, supra note 15, at 174 (“[C]an one really distinguish between coniectura 
[stasis of conjecture] and definitio [stasis of definition]? Are not both concerned with the as-
certainment of facts, and is not the same true for the status qualitatis? Is not definition also 
required in describing the basic act in question, and does not that description also impart to 
us something about the quality of the act?”). 
160  Consider the example from CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 2.59–60, at 223. 
161  As Quintilian said, this led “some writers to include Definition under Conjecture, others 
under Quality . . . .” 3 QUINTILIAN, supra note 102, 7.3.13, at 225. 
162  CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 2.48, at 209. 
163  3 QUINTILIAN, supra note 102, 7.2-7.4, at 185–261. 
164  See infra Part III.E. 
165  See supra Part II.B; infra Part III.E. 
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a. Topoi for the Stasis of Conjecture 
Under the stasis of conjecture, Quintilian identified two primary lines of 
argument: (1) disputes over acts—what happened and who did it?—and (2) 
disputes over intent—if the act and person are clear, why did the person do the 
act?166 An example: An ill elderly man dies after drinking a concoction made 
by his son but administered to him by his friend.167 The son is charged with 
homicide by poison. It is clear the man died, but of what cause—preexisting 
illness or poisoning? If poisoning, did the son or the friend introduce the poi-
son? These arguments are empirical questions about observable facts. 
Conjectural arguments were not just empirical. They could also be conven-
tional, driven by law and society’s understandings about certain categories of 
evidence: “one should and should not” credit suspicions, rumors, testimony 
given under torture, and the like.168 Indeed, conjectural topoi covered all man-
ner of what contemporary lawyers would call credibility and evidentiary weight 
questions, such as disputes over the significance of the accused’s past acts, 
character, and propensities; how much to credit motives, rumors, and witness-
es; and the effect of torture on a given witness’s credibility.169 In particular, ar-
guments about character drew on conventional wisdom about how one’s line-
age or past deeds suggested that an accused did or did not do the act in 
question.170 As to motive, conventional arguments could forge inferential links 
between emotions and actions based on common experience (‘one who feels 
this way tends to act that way’ or ‘unless one feels this way one will not act that 
way’).171 
Finally, community values often animated conjectural arguments. Prosecu-
tors could emphasize a crime’s atrocity to contend that the perpetrator should 
not be pitied.172 The defense could plead for mercy,173 an appeal to empathy. If 
the prosecutor continued to push punishment based on the nature of the crime, 
the defense could attribute malicious motives to the prosecutor, that he was es-
sentially piling on in the hopes that a “damaged and wounded defendant could 
 
166  3 QUINTILIAN, supra note 102, 7.2.1–27, at 185–201. 
167  Id. 7.2.12–21, at 193–97. 
168  CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 2.50, at 211. 
169  Id. 
170  In Quintilian’s words, “a good character and an honourable past life never fail to be a 
great help.” 3 QUINTILIAN, supra note 102, 7.2.33, at 205. 
171  Id. 7.2.35–38, at 205–07. Drawing on the poisoning example, if the son was proven re-
sponsible for administering the poison, a conjectural motive question might be whether the 
son introduced the poison as a means of assisted suicide or cold-blooded murder. Conven-
tional arguments supporting assisted suicide might center on the elderly man’s health and 
state of mind (was he feeling hopeless?), the son’s statements and attitudes towards his fa-
ther (was he loving, compassionate?), and the son’s behaviors near the time of the poisoning 
(did he act in a caring, somber manner?). Id. 7.2.12–21, at 193–97. 
172  CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 2.51, at 213. 
173  Id. 
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be crushed by the odium thus aroused.”174 The prosecutor might respond that 
“it is wrong for crimes to be defended on the ground of their outrageous-
ness.”175 
b. Topoi for the Stasis of Definition 
Under the stasis of definition, Cicero and Quintilian articulated two lines of 
argument: (1) locating the definition itself (which Quintilian called “choosing 
the right name”), and (2) proving its connection to the facts.176 Cicero offers the 
example of a father who admitted to dragging his son out of the popular assem-
bly as his son was haranguing the people during a debate.177 Because the fa-
ther’s act effectively undermined the assembly’s authority, he was accused of 
lese majesty. In this case, the stasis of definition turned not only on the meaning 
of lese-majesty as far as words are concerned178—a matter of locating an au-
thoritative definition—but also on how assembly authority interacted with pa-
ternal authority under the facts of the case—a matter of applying the definition 
to the specific situation at hand. 
As with the stasis of conjecture, the stasis of definition could raise empiri-
cal, conventional, and value-based arguments. Here, empirical arguments 
would involve locating and establishing an authoritative source for the meaning 
of lese majesty. Because ancient legal definitions stemmed from many sources 
outside of Roman civil law,179 pinning down an authoritative source may have 
proved challenging for the ancients. Conventional arguments would center on 
the source’s interpretation; they would discern the definition’s ontological crux 
based on conventional methods of reasoning and construction of meaning.180 In 
this scenario, the parties might debate whether the essence of lese majesty was 
flouting only a particular type of authority or whether it extended more broadly 
to a greater range of authoritative figures or bodies. A value-based argument 
 
174  3 QUINTILIAN, supra note 102, 7.2.31, at 203 (internal quotations omitted). 
175  Id. 7.2.32, at 205 (internal quotations omitted). 
176  Id. 7.3.4, 7.3.19, at 219, 227 (“The order is fixed: first, what a thing is; then, whether it is 
this.”); accord CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 2.53–55, at 215–17. 
177  CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 2.52, at 213. 
178  Id. 2.53, at 215. Notwithstanding the translated terminology about choosing “names” and 
“words,” both Quintilian and Cicero made clear that they were concerned with definitions 
whose ontological meaning suited the situation, not simply with finding words that fit at face 
value. See, e.g., Id. 2.62, at 225 (speaking of “the nature and the essence of the occurrence”). 
179  HERENNIUM, supra note 103, 2.18, at 89; id. 2.19–20, at 91–97. 
180  CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 2.53, at 215 (identifying the need for a “clear and 
conventional definition of the word whose meaning is sought”); see also 3 QUINTILIAN, su-
pra note 102, 7.3.25, at 231 (explaining that “[t]he most useful resource for establishing and 
refuting a Definition is to be found in Properties and Differentiae, sometimes also in Ety-
mology.”); id. 7.6-7.9, at 265-288 (describing various methods of constructing meaning for 
definitions based on laws that are ambiguous in their meaning or scope). 
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might then, in Cicero’s words, “enlarge[e] on the advantage and honour arising 
from the [father’s] act.”181 
Quintilian offered his own interpretive example. If a man stole private 
money from a temple, was it ordinary theft or sacrilege?182 Empirical argu-
ments would center on finding authoritative sources for the definitions of theft 
and sacrilege. Then the analytical work would begin with conventional argu-
ments about sacrilege’s ontological essence. The prosecution might contend, 
for example, that the essence of sacrilege is “stealing something from a sacred 
place.”183 The defense might retort that “[s]acrilege is stealing something sa-
cred,” contending that the location is not part of the offense’s definition.184 This 
may look like verbal sophistry,185 but the dispute was really about pinning 
down the essence of sacrilege—nature of object or type of location? Which def-
inition prevailed might depend not only on how sacrilege had been convention-
ally defined, but also perhaps on animating values. Thus, the prosecution’s val-
ue-oriented arguments might appeal to feelings about the sanctity of religious 
spaces, while the defense’s value-oriented arguments might draw on sentiments 
tied to religious objects.186 
c. Topoi for the Stasis of Quality 
Quintilian’s theorizing on the topoi for the stasis of quality reveals two key 
points.187 First, he demonstrates how quality topoi were often empirical, con-
ventional, and value based all at once.188 Second, just as the stasis of quality 
 
181  CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 103, 2.55, at 219. 
182  3 QUINTILIAN, supra note 102, 7.3.21–22, at 229. 
183  Id. 7.3.23, at 229 (emphasis added). This would arguably exclude sacred items stolen 
from a private home—perhaps not a problem for the prosecution in this case since the origi-
nal location of the item is undisputed. See id. 7.3.24, at 229. 
184  Id. 7.3.23–24, at 229 (emphasis added). This would arguably exclude garden-variety 
items stolen from a sacred place. 
185  For Quintilian, discerning a definition was difficult and fraught with the risk of engaging 
in the “acute verbal sophistry” characteristic of philosophical dialectic. Id. 7.3.14, at 225. He 
thus insisted that a definition must be an “impregnable,” id. 7.3.18, at 227, and an “accurate, 
lucid, and brief verbal expression of a fact.” id. 7.3.2–3, at 219. 
186  A slightly different interpretive problem is presented by extending a definition outside of 
its essence, which, Quintilian says, is a matter of using conventional reasoning “from a cer-
tain fact to an uncertain one.” 3 QUINTILIAN, supra note 102, 7.8.6, at 279. An example: “It is 
illegal to drag a man to court from his house. [The accused] has dragged him out of his tent.” 
Id. 7.8.7, at 279 (internal quotations omitted). The definitional arguments over the legality of 
this act would start with conventional logical reasoning: Is the act illegal because a tent is 
lived in like a house, or not, because a tent is a more transient structure? Value-based argu-
ments could be made here as well, such as whether being dragged from a more transient 
structure is less an affront to the sense of security one has in a residence. 
187  Id. 7.2.1, at 185. Regarding the topoi for this stasis, Cicero said they are often sui generis 
and must be developed in response to each case’s specifics. CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra note 
103, 2.68, at 233. 
188  See infra notes 192–195 and accompanying text. 
20 NEV. L.J. 967 
Spring 2020] CIVIL PROCEDURE 999 
raises nested stases of conjecture and definition, the quality topoi are really just 
a combination of conjecture and definition topoi, as explained below. 
To begin with, Quintilian designated separate topoi for absolute and as-
sumptive issues.189 Empirical arguments for absolute questions centered on 
finding the source establishing an inherent right.190 Once identified, the source 
embodied the relevant conventions and values—they were basically built into 
the source, requiring no further argumentation. Quintilian used the example of 
fathers who disinherited sons acting against paternal wishes by becoming sol-
diers, running for office, or marrying.191 The legality of these instances of dis-
inheritance turned entirely on how intrinsically or conventionally right they 
were by nature or custom without reference to anything else. 
For assumptive issues, Quintilian maintained the standard exculpatory cat-
egories of justification and necessity.192 A justification example: “He was 
blinded, but he was a rapist.”193 Here, empirical arguments might mirror those 
under the conjectural stasis—did the accused actually blind the person, and was 
the person really a rapist? But the topoi could also track the definitional stasis 
arguments, trying to pin down a source that justifies vigilante justice for an un-
punished crime. Conventional arguments concerning the accused’s rapist-
punishing motive could likewise track the conjectural, drawing on inferences 
from the accused’s acts and statements around the time of the incident. Con-
ventional arguments might also interpret the source of the justification to dis-
cern its true essence, as in the definitional realm. Value-based arguments could 
appeal to a sense of justice based on the proportionality of the injury to the be-
havior that motivated it. 
Similar topoi applied to excusing arguments, exemplified in the case of a 
soldier who defends his act of making an illegal treaty under duress from his 
commander.194 Empirical arguments would, again, look like a combination of 
conjecture and definition: testing these contentions’ factual accuracy and locat-
ing the sources for a just-following-orders duress excuse. Similarly, conven-
tional arguments would deal with inferences about the accused’s motives and 
the sources’ meanings. Value-based arguments would appeal to audience feel-
ings about which directive was more important to follow—a superior’s military 
order or the general law of the land.195 
 
189  3 QUINTILIAN, supra note 102, 7.4.4–12, at 239–43. 
190  According to Quintilian, absolute sources must either be from nature, or from conven-
tional law, custom, legal precedent, or contract. Id. 7.4.6, at 239–41. 
191  Id. 7.4.4, at 239. 
192  Id. 7.4.9, at 241. 
193  Id. 7.4.9, at 241 (internal quotations omitted). 
194  Id. 7.4.13–14, at 243, 245. 
195  Less desirable assumptive arguments according to Quintilian were the excuses of igno-
rance and necessity. Id. 7.4.15, at 245. About topoi for these, Quintilian said only that the 
lines of argument rest on the wrongdoer’s well-meaning. Id. In other words, the more com-
pelling and strongly held the value underlying this excuse, the more likely the argument was 
to succeed. See id. 7.4.31–32, at 255 (“[I]t is sometimes sufficient to secure an acquittal to 
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d. Topoi for the Stasis of Objection (a.k.a. Transference) 
Because Quintilian did not consider procedural issues to raise their own 
stases,196 he did not develop topoi for them. De Inventione did, but Cicero 
pointed out that procedural issues rarely come up in trial speeches,197 because 
many of them—particularly those going to the form of the case—were disposed 
of before the trial by the praetor.198 Nonetheless, Cicero did identify some 
commonplace arguments, ranging from contending that “the action is set up 
this way through stupidity,” “necessity,” or “convenience”; to interpreting civil 
law and “studying what has been done in similar cases”; to condemning the el-
evation of technicalities over substance versus lauding procedural integrity.199 
But just as Quintilian viewed the content of procedural arguments as dependent 
on nested issues of conjecture, definition, and quality, Cicero’s own description 
of procedural topoi concedes the same. 
e. The Victory-Based Philosophy of Stasis Theory 
The stases came of age in Greek and Roman legal systems whose values 
and boundaries diverged sharply from modern civil procedure and the critical-
discussion framework. The very fact that the stases operated largely outside of 
formal law as we know it, appealing to communal notions of justice and natural 
law, seems to render it a wholly other system of argument—one not constrained 
by rationality, restraint, and contemporary notions of fairness. 
Indeed, as this Part reveals, rather than building arguments aimed at con-
vincing a reasonable critic, stasis theory constructed arguments to ensure victo-
ry—using any facts and reasons available—including appeals to emotion, as-
sumptions based on past deeds, and now-condemned conceptions of retribution 
and formal class hierarchies. Among other things, our legal system would not 
accept arguments justifying acts of vigilantism. It would not condone appeals to 
a person’s lineage or license bald assertions about liability based on reputation. 
 
say that the culprit has only sinned once, or that the act was done in error, or that it is not as 
bad as is alleged.”). A case-in-point was mental incapacity, which may be so impairing as to 
remove moral culpability entirely, although Quintilian urged caution since “anger and pas-
sion are only too much like madness.” Id. 7.4.31, at 253. 
196  See HERENNIUM, supra note 103, 1.18–19, 1.24, at 35, 43. 
197  The range of translative issues is wide, encompassing what contemporary law would 
consider jurisdictional issues, party issues, statute of limitations issues, venue issues, and 
technical pleading issues that include failure to state a claim. CICERO, INVENTIONE, supra 
note 103, 2.57, at 219, 221 (translative covers contentions that “the proper person does not 
bring the action, or it is not brought against the proper person or before the proper court, or 
under the proper statute, or with a proper request for a penalty, or with the proper accusation, 
or at the proper time.”) 
198  Id. 2.57–58, at 221. Though more rarely, translative issues could come up at trial when 
the theory of the case rested on one very serious charge, but the trial evidence pointed to an-
other much less serious charge, rendering the original indictment void. Id. 2.58–59, at 221–
23. 
199  Id. 2.60–61, at 223–25. 
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And it would not allow parties to attribute bad personal motives to the opposi-
tion and then use those motives to justify a result in their favor. In our system, 
constraints on these types of arguments may stem from the substantive law, 
ethical rules, the Rules of Evidence, or the FRCP. But because the FRCP aims 
to facilitate fair and rational decisions on the merits,200 it incorporates these 
systemic values no matter what their source. 
In sum, as satisfying as stasis theory is from an analytical standpoint—it 
offers a range of commonplace arguments for trans-substantive issues that mir-
ror those raised in civil cases—it presents theoretical and normative challenges 
for our model. Still, when integrated with the critical-discussion framework, 
constrained to fit civil procedure norms, and adapted to cure categorical and 
fluidity problems, the stases do offer a range of acceptable trans-substantive ar-
gument types. 
C. Hohmann’s Adaptation of Stasis Theory 
Our adaptation of the stases draws on the work of law-trained communica-
tion scholar Hanns Hohmann.201 Hohmann meant to rescue the stases from 
charges of poor theorization and to apply them to legal and other types of ar-
gument.202 As this subsection shows, his approach was to view the stases 
through the lens of internal argument dynamics that are consistent across the 
stases and which account for their apparent overlap and fluidity. By identifying 
these dynamics—what he called “argument dimensions”—Hohmann aimed to 
“generate a useful systematization of basic types of arguments in law as well as 
in other fields . . . .”203 
Hohmann’s first step toward systemization was to reconceive of the three 
primary stases according to the claims they make: “(1) [t]hat something exists 
of whose precise nature the audience is to be persuaded” (conjecture); “(2) 
[t]hat according to applicable standards this existing thing belongs to a certain 
category[,] which indicates to the audience the proper response to the thing” 
(definition); and “(3) [t]hat these applicable standards themselves and the cate-
gorization based on them are justified by a higher standard” (quality).204 These 
claims, he noted, correspond roughly to the argumentative activities of verifica-
 
200  See supra text accompanying notes 16–41, 63–71, 73. 
201  Hohmann, Hanns J, SAN JOSÉ STATE UNIV., http://www.sjsu.edu/people/hanns.hohmann  
[https://perma.cc/VG6Q-FLHZ] (last visited Feb. 4, 2020). 
202  See Hohmann, supra note 15, at 171. 
203  Id. at 175–76. This article is limited to Hohmann’s discussion of legal argument. 
204  Id. at 178. Notably, Hohmann’s characterization of quality claims as dependent on the 
justification provided by a “higher standard” is consistent with the stasis theorist’s descrip-
tion of absolute and assumptive issues. Both turn on notions of right and wrong and justice 
that stem from natural law and community norms. See supra text accompanying notes 147–
159. 
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tion, interpretation, and justification.205 And, in his view, they represent argu-
ment dimensions within each stasis, as well as within legal arguments.206 
Hohmann renamed the verification dimension “operative,” the interpreta-
tion dimension “regulative,” and the justification dimension “optative.”207 Mir-
roring the empirical, conventional, and value-based topoi we found in Cicero 
and Quintilian for the rational stases, each dimension appears in recurring pat-
terns in what Hohmann deems law’s three essential argument types: (1) factual 
arguments, (2) rule-interpretation/application arguments, and (3) philosophi-
cal/moral arguments.208 Because purely philosophical and moral arguments do 
not commonly play a role in civil-procedure argumentation, we address only 
two argument types: factual and rule-interpretation/application. As we will see 
in Part III, these two argument types map directly onto the civil-procedure crit-
ical-discussion argumentation stage.209 
1. Dimensions of Factual Arguments 
In arguments about facts, Hohmann’s operative dimension deals with ob-
servable phenomena that “point in the direction” of a factual conclusion,210 just 
as Cicero and Quintilian’s empirical topoi did in the conjectural stasis.211 Ar-
guments along this dimension might try to establish, for example, “that there 
was a corpse in a certain place, that at some point there was a knife nearby, 
[and] that the witness has reported that he saw the accused in the vicinity 
. . . .”212 Hohmann’s regulative dimension, in turn, incorporates conventional 
standards of fact-finding. This includes drawing permissible inferences through 
logical reasoning and human experience,213 such as inferring that A was re-
sponsible for B’s death based on the location of B’s corpse, the nearby knife, 
and A being near the scene at the time, covered with blood. The regulative di-
mension also covers presumptions and evidentiary rules,214 which can dictate 
the weight of evidence, reject certain inferences from the evidence, and even 
exclude evidence altogether.215 These regulative arguments parallel the Roman 
conventional topoi in the stasis of conjecture.216 
 
205  Hohmann, supra note 15, at 179. 
206  Id. 
207  Id. 
208  Id. at 180. Huhn describes five types of legal argument, argument from text, intent, prec-
edent, tradition, policy. See generally HUHN, supra note 15. 
209  See discussion infra Part III.B, C, D. 
210  Hohmann, supra note 15, at 180. 
211  See supra note 103; supra text accompanying notes 168–169. 
212  Hohmann, supra note 15, at 180. 
213  See id. 
214  See id. 
215  See id. at 181. 
216  See supra text accompanying notes 166–75. 
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Rarely, Hohmann notes, an optative dimension comes into play when fact-
finding standards “are as good as we can make them,” but a higher value mili-
tates against finding a given fact.217 Our current system so devalues this sort of 
reasoning that we rarely see it; the classic example is jury nullification.218 This 
“higher value” argument dimension played a much larger role in the ancient 
stasis of conjecture, where bald appeals to pity, outrage, retribution, and the 
like were legion.219 
2. Dimensions of Rule Interpretation/Application Arguments 
Hohmann next addresses arguments about rule interpretation and rule ap-
plication, which he packaged together just as the Roman stasis of definition 
did.220 These arguments “establish that a certain rule does indeed apply to the 
facts found, and that thus a particular legal characterization of and response to 
those facts is justified.”221 Here, Hohmann treats rule validity arguments sepa-
rately from rule interpretation/application arguments.222 Most salient for civil 
procedure are rule interpretation/application arguments, which track the Ro-
mans’ definitional stasis topoi.223 Here, Hohmann’s operative dimension covers 
debates over “the common understanding of the terms used in the rule,” the ex-
istence of which he deems an empirical matter.224 If the terms’ common mean-
ings are unclear or unsatisfactory, the regulative dimension kicks in, encom-
passing all of the conventional interpretive tools our system offers.225 These 
standard methods of constructing meaning correspond to Quintilian’s legal-
interpretive topoi;226 nowadays they are directed foremost at discerning legisla-
tive will.227 
In line with this focus on legislative purpose, the optative—or “higher 
standard”—dimension of rule interpretation and application arguments rarely 
makes explicit justice or equity appeals. Instead, these value-based “considera-
 
217  Hohmann, supra note 15, at 182 (characterizing this dimension as a conflict “between 
our normal standards of fact-finding and the demands of justice as we see them in particular 
circumstances.”). 
218  Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 253–56 (1996) 
(describing the controversial nature of jury nullification, which “occurs when the defendant’s 
[legal] guilt is clear beyond a reasonable doubt, but the jury, based on its own sense of jus-
tice or fairness, decides to acquit.”); see also id. at 257 (positing that any benefits of jury nul-
lification “pale in comparison to the doctrine’s undesirable collateral effects.”). 
219  See supra text accompanying notes 168–75. 
220  See Hohmann, supra note 15, at 185 (“[T]he argument may next turn to the applicability 
of that rule to the situation at hand, and we thus deal with the question of interpretation 
. . . .”); supra text accompanying notes 176–86. 
221  Hohmann, supra note 15, at 183. 
222  Id. at 184–90. 
223  See supra text accompanying notes 176–86. 
224  Hohmann, supra note 15, at 185. 
225  Id. 
226  See supra text accompanying notes 182–86. 
227  Hohmann, supra note 15, at 187. 
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tions are used to reach or further justify results[,] which are primarily based on 
letter or spirit,”228 as when one statutory reading would lead to a “parade of 
horribles”229 while another would create efficiencies or observe proper institu-
tional roles for legal actors.230 
3. Hohmann’s Contributions to the Critical Discussion-Stasis Model 
Hohmann’s theory of argument dimensions makes sense of the classical 
stases’ category confusion and divisional fluidity by channeling their core 
claims into dimensions of legal arguments. But Hohmann’s argument dimen-
sions are not limited to points actually licensed in contemporary civil proce-
dure. In fact, Hohmann concedes that his optative dimension is frequently ex-
tra-legal and generates purely moral or philosophical arguments that, in PD 
terms, a reasonable judge acting rationally within our system’s constraints 
would likely not accept. In theoretical terms, it is important to recognize the op-
tative dimension because the optative or value-based law-change arguments of 
one generation often become the regulative or conventional status quo in the 
next.231 Nonetheless, because our model aims to fit civil procedure’s current 
norms and constraints, the optative/value-based dimension plays a lesser role in 
our model, while the operative/empirical and regulative/conventional dimen-
sions take center stage. 
 
228  Id. at 178, 188. Another, more purely optative argument echoes the goal of the ancient 
stasis of definition: “the task of the legal interpreter should not be the attribution of meaning 
to terms according to semantic contentions, but rather the determination of the true nature of 
the entities to which legal terms refer”—for example, arguments about the “true nature” of 
“death” or “malice.” Id. at 188; see also text accompanying notes 179–86. As of now, this 
dimension of interpretation and application remains truly optative, for it has not been adopt-
ed as a conventional method of interpretation in American law. 
229  Ellie Margolis, Closing the Floodgates: Making Persuasive Policy Arguments in Appel-
late Briefs, 62 MONT. L. REV. 59, 73 (2001) (“A slippery slope argument asserts that if the 
proposed rule is adopted, the court will not be able to prevent its application to an ever 
broadening set of cases.”). 
230  Id. at 68. Hohmann also addresses “the overall optative dimension of the arguments fo-
cusing on legal rules,” a more radical approach that advocates disregarding the rule notwith-
standing the operative and regulative aspects in its favor. Hohmann, supra note 15, at 188. 
As an example, he points to constitutions whose explicit provisions state that international 
law may supersede them. Id. at 189. Such arguments held more sway in ancient court cases, 
where natural law and other norms frequently were the law. See text accompanying notes 
148–52. 
231  For the role of value-based arguments in definitional disputes, consider the extended dis-
cussion of the values and history behind the institution of marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593–96 (2015), which Justice Kennedy mobilized in support of the deci-
sion that same-sex marriage would be legally recognized throughout the United States; an 
optative argument about the rule thus became an empirical fact. For their role in conjectural 
contexts, consider the common-law convention that a child born to a married woman is le-
gally the child of her husband. Helene S. Shapo, Assisted Reproduction and the Law: Dis-
harmony on a Divisive Social Issue, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 465, 467 (2006). There were no 
doubt optative arguments for that conclusion the first time a court reached it, but once courts 
widely accepted it, it become a conventional presumption. 
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III. THE CRITICAL DISCUSSION–STASIS MODEL 
In the Introduction to this Article, we proposed that modern and classical 
argument theories offer a way to understand dispute-resolution systems in ar-
gumentation-theoretic terms. We chose to explore the FRCP as a paradigm 
case. To develop the philosophical, theoretical, and methodological tools for 
that exploration, Part I of this Article adopted pragma-dialectics (PD) as a 
framework for viewing the FRCP as a critical discussion. There, we described 
the roles of a critical discussion’s confrontation, opening, argumentation, and 
concluding stages, but we noted that these stages need adjustment to fit the 
structure of a civil suit. We also observed that PD’s argumentation stage oper-
ates on too minute a scale—sentence- or paragraph-level—to construct civil 
procedure argument content. In Part II, we proposed Roman classical stasis 
theory as a candidate to fill this content gap. Stasis theory does this by identify-
ing the stopping points where an arbiter is called on to resolve a difference of 
opinion on the core questions of conjecture (what happened), definition (its le-
gal name or characterization), quality (mitigating circumstances or defenses), 
and procedure. Stasis theory also offers a method for devising common argu-
ments or topoi that can be used in cases of any kind. Some of its theoretical 
problems were resolved by contemporary theorist Hanns Hohmann’s argument 
dynamics theory, but Hohmann did not cure the normative mismatch. 
Here in Part III, we integrate and adapt both theories to develop our critical 
discussion-stasis model—a model that is philosophically, theoretically, and an-
alytically congruent with civil procedure. Our model has two primary compo-
nents. The first component maps the four PD critical discussion stages onto the 
discourse moves in a civil suit. We use this normatively compatible framework 
to show how civil procedure moves are designed to convince the reasonable 
critic to reach rational results, with the overriding goal of fairly resolving suits 
on the merits. Against this backdrop, the parties advance litigation stases; that 
is, disputed standpoints seeking decisions from the court. Those stases supply 
the second component of our model.232 Molded to fit the procedural structure of 
civil suits, our litigation stases are a package of confrontations, argumentation, 
and conclusions about a claim, defense, or procedural issue. Working together, 
these two components of our model supply a complete framework for under-
standing how a rational decisionmaker may judge reasonably in federal civil 
litigation, along with a taxonomy of rational argument types, or topoi. 
To illustrate the first component, the mapping of a lawsuit’s critical discus-
sion, we use the case of Rivera v. Mendéz & Compañía,233 litigated in the Unit-
ed States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. In section III.A, we tell 
the basic story of the case. Section III.B then uses our model to reconstruct how 
the Rivera litigation proceeded through the critical discussion’s opening stages, 
 
232  The stases are synonymous with PD standpoints, but the stases come with an argument 
taxonomy. 
233  Docket, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. 2013). 
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while also making discourse moves advancing standpoints that were resolved 
through confrontation, argumentation, and concluding stages.234 Section III.C 
defines the stases in a civil suit, and section III.D reveals their conjectural and 
definitional dimensions. Section III.E then develops the rational range of per-
missible arguments—the topoi—in these static dimensions. 
A. The Rivera Case 
The claims in Rivera v. Mendéz & Compañía were born together on June 7, 
2011, and were decided by a jury over two years later on December 26, 
2013.235 The case was brought by Dennis Mario Rivera, a Puerto Rican artist 
who designed promotional posters for the Puerto Rico Heineken Jazz Fest each 
year from 1998 through 2009.236 The organizer of the festival was Mendéz & 
Compañía, the distributor of Heineken beer in Puerto Rico. Its executive, Luis 
Álvarez, was also a friend of the artist. For over a decade, the festival organiz-
ers paid Mr. Rivera to reproduce his artwork on “posters, t-shirts, bus shelter[ 
ads], etc.”237 But for the twentieth annual festival in 2010, the organizers hired 
a different artist.238 Still they continued to use Mr. Rivera’s works, incorporat-
ing them into a collage featured on festival programs, displaying them on 
commemorative merchandise, and featuring them on a website celebrating the 
festival’s history.239 Though Mr. Rivera eventually won nearly $150,000 at tri-
al,240 the case settled on appeal to the First Circuit.241 
 
234  As the rare case proceeding through trial to a judgment, Rivera is a rich source of dis-
course moves, illustrating how a case moves through all litigation phases as a critical discus-
sion designed to convince a reasonable judge to reach rational results. The argumentative 
content of the Rivera discourse moves is not as robust, however, and as a result we use other 
examples for the stasis-based aspects of our model in sections III.C, III.D, and III.E. 
235  Docket, supra note 233. Reported opinions for this case appear at 824 F. Supp. 2d 265 
(D.P.R. 2011) (granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s moral right claims), 988 F. 
Supp. 2d 159 (D.P.R. 2013) (granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff’s motion for 
summary judgment and denying Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment), 988 F. 
Supp. 2d 174 (D.P.R. 2013) (granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motions to 
strike and exclude expert testimonies). For ease of reference in this Article, we refer to the 
other documents in the case’s docket by document name and docket number. See Complaint 
for Copyright Infringement & Injunctive Relief at 1, No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. June 7, 2011), 
ECF No. 1; Final Judgment at 1, No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Dec. 30, 2013), ECF No. 205. 
236  Rivera, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 164–65. 
237  Id. 
238  Id. at 165. 
239  Id. 
240  Final Judgment, supra note 235, at 1. 
241  Amended Final Judgment at 1, No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Nov. 6, 2014), ECF No. 244; Notice 
of Appeal at 1, No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. May 12, 2014), ECF No. 232. 
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Although the Rivera case is not substantively remarkable, the fact that it 
was tried makes it exceptional in a procedural sense as the rare dispute to pro-
ceed through every litigation phase.242 The next section explains how the stages 
of a critical discussion map onto a lawsuit, using Rivera as an illustration. Fig-
ure 1 provides a graphical representation that may prove helpful for following 
the structure. 
B.  The Lawsuit as a Critical Discussion in Action 
Adapted to the non-linear nature of litigation, the four PD critical discus-
sion stages can be mapped onto the discourse moves in every phase of a civil 
case. Broadly speaking, just as these four stages anticipate areas of agreement 
and disagreement, the FRCP envision the parties both cooperating and advocat-
ing. At the same time as the Rules require advocates to periodically advance 
diametrically opposed positions to narrow down what the suit is really about, 
the Rules expect ongoing cooperation—for parties to negotiate, to stipulate, 
and, if necessary, to concede.243 The judge, in turn, manages and decides the 
parties’ dialectical disputes but also encourages agreement whenever possible, 
often coaxing parties to settle.244 These dichotomous party and judging roles 
surface in the critical-discussion framework’s opening stage (cooperative) as 
well as in its confrontation, argument, and conclusion phases (adversarial). 
 
242  Of more than 325,000 federal district court cases terminated in the one-year period end-
ing June 30, 2019, less than 1 percent were terminated during or after trial. See U.S. COURTS, 
TABLE C-4—U.S. DISTRICT COURTS–CIVIL STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
(2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-4/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2019 
/06/30 [https://perma.cc/Y3NW-NAT9]. 
243  E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a), (c)(1), 26(c)(1), 36, 37(a)(1), (d)(1)(B) (requiring parties to 
discuss settlement at pretrial conferences, to meet and confer about discovery disputes before 
filing motions, and to make stipulations and admissions). 
244  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a) (“In any action, the court may order the attorneys and any 
unrepresented parties to appear for one or more pretrial conferences for such purposes as . . . 
facilitating settlement.”); see also sources cited supra note 99. 
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Specifically, a federal lawsuit starts with a confrontation stage, the law-
suit’s filing. This is followed by an initial opening stage that gives way to sub-
sidiary opening stages as understanding of facts improves, as legal positions 
become more refined, and as the true merits of the case come into focus. In ef-
fect, everything that happens in the suit is part of an extended opening stage, 
serving as the opening stage for argumentation that happens after it. This large-
scale structure is depicted on the left side of Figure 1. All four stages then recur 
within the stases: the points at which the parties seek a judicial decision. Figure 
1 depicts two example stases on its right side. Following a subsidiary opening, 
which consists of the record in the suit to that point, each stasis begins with a 
confrontation where a party presents a standpoint, and the other parties and the 
judge learn there is a difference of opinion requiring adjudication. The argu-
mentation stage follows, where the proposing party seeks to overcome the deci-
sionmaker’s or opponent’s doubts about the standpoint. As Figure 1 shows, the 
same motion paper can function both to give notice to the court and opposing 
parties of the matter—as confrontation—and to provide argumentative support 
for it—as argumentation. The stasis ends with a concluding stage, in which the 
proposing party retracts, the opposing party concedes—via negotiation, stipula-
tion, or concession—or the court decides the standpoint. 
1. Seeking Common Ground: Initial and Subsidiary Opening Stages 
To say that a civil suit’s opening stage is cooperative is not to say that the 
parties agree with each other or that the judge agrees with any of the parties. It 
simply refers to the cooperative objective of discerning common ground.245 In a 
federal civil suit, the obvious common ground consists of the discussion format 
and rules: a combination of the FRCP themselves, federal jurisdictional stat-
utes, and constitutional procedural doctrines that govern where and how the 
case should be litigated.246 
As a practical matter, a civil case’s opening stage begins with the plead-
ings, which reveal the scope of the lawsuit.247 This is vital common ground, for 
a critical discussion requires a clear understanding of what is being discussed 
and who is participating. To that end, the complaint articulates the bases for ju-
 
245  See supra text accompanying notes 89–90. 
246  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018) (conferring federal question jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332 (2018) (conferring diversity jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2018) (conferring sup-
plemental jurisdiction); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781–83 
(2017) (refining the standards for specific personal jurisdiction); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 
571 U.S. 117, 133–37 (2014) (setting the standard for general personal jurisdiction); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980) (establishing minimum 
contacts framework for specific personal jurisdiction). 
247  FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c) (requiring service of the complaint on the defendant to begin a law-
suit); FED. R. CIV. P. 5 (requiring service of all pleadings on opposing parties); Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 8(a) (requiring litigants to provide “short and plain statement[s]” of the basis for federal 
jurisdiction, the claims, and the relief sought); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (describing required con-
tents of responsive pleadings). 
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risdiction, the legally relevant factual allegations, the legal claims that make the 
allegations actionable, the remedies sought, and, if applicable, a demand for a 
jury trial.248 In the answer, the defendant admits or denies those allegations and 
can raise unwaived 12(b) defenses and affirmative defenses.249 The answer can 
also bring the defendant’s own claims, either against the plaintiff or against a 
third party involved in the same transaction or occurrence.250 Together, then, 
the pleadings identify common ground in the form of uncontested allegations, 
along with defining the claims, defenses, and counterclaims that will be ad-
dressed in the case, as well as identifying who will participate in the critical 
discussion.251  
The Rivera case’s pleadings illustrate this initial opening stage and its 
function of defining common ground in the suit’s scope. Based on the alleged 
continued and unauthorized use of his artwork, Mr. Rivera sued Mendéz & 
Compañía, Luis Álvarez, Heineken, and several Does, bringing four intellectual 
property claims. These claims alleged that the defendants had (1) infringed the 
copyrights in his works under federal copyright law; (2) “[d]istorted, mutilated 
or modified” his works in violation of the federal Visual Artists Rights Act 
(VARA); (3) “destroyed the integrity” of his works under the Puerto Rico Intel-
lectual Property Act (PRIPA); and (4) “attacked the paternity of the works” un-
der PRIPA by attributing them to another artist. Álvarez and Mendéz joined the 
critical discussion when they received their summons on June 8.252 After filing 
a successful Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the VARA and PRIPA claims,253 
Mendéz and Álvarez filed an answer to the remaining copyright claim.254 
There, they denied some of Mr. Rivera’s factual allegations, including the 
scope of the license that Mr. Rivera alleged he had given them to his works.255 
They also asserted other facts about their use of the images and the circum-
stances of their creation to support affirmative defenses raised in the answer, 
 
248  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), 38(b). 
249  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b), 8(c), 12(b), 12(h). 
250  FED. R. CIV. P. 13 (counterclaims); FED. R. CIV. P. 14 (third-party claims). Those parties, 
then, have largely the same options as the original defendant did. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a), 
13(b), 14(a)(2), 14(5). 
251  Common ground is also temporarily ceded when the defendant files a Rule 12(b)(6) mo-
tion. Even if the defendant ultimately disagrees with the complaint’s allegations, for purpos-
es of challenging legal sufficiency, those allegations are common ground that must be as-
sumed true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). But see id. (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the 
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals 
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suf-
fice.”). 
252  Complaint, supra note 235, at ¶¶ 45, 48, 50. 
253  See infra text accompanying note 261. 
254  Answer, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Aug. 30, 2011), ECF No. 23. 
255  Id. ¶ 17; Complaint, supra note 235, at ¶ 17. 
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including implied license and fair use.256 Thus, by the end of the pleadings 
phase, it was clear that, at least at the outset, the critical discussion would in-
volve three parties engaged in a copyright dispute that would be defended by 
both contesting whether the copyright infringement elements existed in the first 
place, and by excuse: a legal use of copyrighted materials. 
But in a federal civil suit, the scope is continually up for discussion and re-
formulation.257 Even though the basic parameters are set early on through the 
pleadings, those pleadings can be amended. Claims and defenses can be added, 
dismissed, or stricken.258 Parties can join or be joined, intervene, interplead, or 
be impleaded;259 class actions can be certified.260 In Rivera, for instance, three 
of the four claims were dismissed by 12(b)(6) motion,261 and Mr. Rivera twice 
amended the complaint to add defendants, once more than eighteen months af-
ter filing the first complaint.262 That is why our model views the initial opening 
stage as extended. Consequently, the confrontation moves depicted in dark gray 
in Figure 1 continue intermittently for nearly two years after the summons was 
originally served. 
Subsidiary opening stages arise as the parties continue to establish common 
ground on discrete procedural matters. In discovery, a subsidiary opening stage 
takes the form of the Rule 26(f) conference and Rule 16 scheduling confer-
ences.263 A mandatory meeting under the Rules, the 26(f) conference gets the 
 
256  Answer, supra note 254, at ¶¶ 1–9. 
257  The concept of a shifting suit scope prompting recurring but focused opening stages is a 
built-in feature of the FRCP that is fully consistent with both the normative and theoretical 
goals of the critical discussion framework. Just as that framework aims to fully air, vet, and 
evaluate arguments rationally, the Rules’ liberal stance towards changing claims and parties 
(within limits) is one that serves the merits by capturing as fully as possible an accurate uni-
verse of facts, legal issues, and participants needed to decide the case efficiently, fairly, and 
accurately, as described so well by Charles Alan Wright: 
The genius of the new rules is their recognition that no rule of pleading . . . can offer a satisfying 
answer to all the different kinds of fact situations which may arise. The only valid way to handle 
the problem is to say that it is desirable to include as many claims and parties as there are in one 
suit . . . . And no legislature can say what the optimum size of a lawsuit is under each particular 
constellation of allegations in the pleadings. The new rules, therefore, allow, for practical pur-
poses, joinder of any claim or any party, and then leave it to the trial judge to order separate tri-
als for particular claims or issues . . . . 
Charles Alan Wright, Joinder of Claims and Parties Under Modern Pleading Rules, 36 
MINN. L. REV. 580, 581 (1952). 
258  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), 12(f), 15. 
259  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(7), 14, 18–22, 24. 
260  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
261  Rivera v. Méndez & Co., 824 F. Supp. 2d 265, 269; see also Motion to Dismiss Moral 
Right Claims Under VARA & the Puerto Rico Intellectual Property Law, Rivera, 824 F. 
Supp. 2d at 269 (D.P.R. 2011) (No. 11-01530), ECF No. 9. 
262  Motion for Leave to Amend Pleadings & Extension to Serve Waiver of Summons, Rive-
ra v. Mendez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Mar. 12, 2012), ECF No. 48; Motion for Leave to 
Amend Pleadings at ¶ 7, 10, Rivera v. Mendez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Feb. 6, 2013), 
ECF No. 80. 
263  See infra notes 264–69. 
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parties together without the judge to formulate a joint discovery plan.264 During 
this conference, the parties explore and settle on as many discovery matters as 
possible, including the nature and basis of claims and defenses; preservation 
issues; and a plan that (1) specifies the timing and subjects of discovery, (2) 
identifies anticipated privilege, work product, and protective order issues, and 
(3) alters discovery default rules.265 The 26(f) conference also provides a built-
in opportunity to conduct settlement negotiations.266 Following the 26(f) con-
ference, the parties submit a joint proposed discovery plan to the judge and at-
tend a Rule 16 scheduling conference.267 There, the judge and the parties dis-
cuss the plan, along with the possibility of submitting the case to a magistrate 
judge, dates for future Rule 16 conferences and trial, and any admissions or 
stipulations that can be obtained at that time.268 Emerging from that conference 
is a Rule 16 scheduling order embodying the parties’ agreements on these mat-
ters, insofar as the judge also concurs with them.269 
This extended opening stage is visible in Rivera over the summer and fall 
of 2011.270 In an order issued on August 9, the judge set a settlement/mediation 
conference for August 18.271 On that date, the parties met with the judge but did 
not settle,272 and the judge thereafter issued a scheduling order that referred the 
case to a magistrate judge.273 After a meeting with the parties on October 12, 
the magistrate judge issued a scheduling order for the major phases of the liti-
gation in 2012: (1) the January and February due dates for expert reports, (2) a 
March close of discovery, and (3) a dispositive motions deadline in April.274 
The parties later moved to revise this schedule,275 resulting in a new August 
 
264  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
265  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2)–(3). 
266  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2). 
267  FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(1)(a), 26(f)(2). 
268  FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a); D.P.R. CIV. R. 16(a)(5); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 29. 
269  FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b); D.P.R. CIV. R. 16(b). 
270  The docket and many of these entries are accessible on ECF/PACER, which charges a 
fee for access. For references to them, see Docket, supra note 233. 
271  Order, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Aug. 9, 2011), ECF No. 19. The 
judge apparently ordered this D.P.R. CIV. R. 16(i) settlement/mediation conference before 
the Rule 26 scheduling conference. Order, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. 
Aug. 23, 2011), ECF No. 22. 
272  Minute Entry, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Aug. 18, 2011), ECF No. 
20. 
273  Referral to Magistrate Judge for Initial Scheduling Conference, Rivera v. Mendez & Co., 
No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Aug. 23, 2011), ECF No. 21. The parties filed a Joint Initial Scheduling 
Conference Memorandum, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Sept. 15, 2011) 
ECF No. 26, in anticipation of the Rule 26 conference. 
274  Minutes of Proceedings, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Oct. 13, 2011), 
ECF No. 33. 
275  Plaintiff’s Informative Motion and Request for Extension at ¶ 5, Rivera v. Méndez & 
Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Feb. 13, 2011), ECF No. 40; Motion for Extension to Conclude 
Discovery at ¶ 2–5, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Mar. 6, 2011), ECF No. 
45; Motion for Extension of Time to Answer Interrogs, Request for Production of Docu-
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deadline for discovery and a new September dispositive motion deadline.276 
Over time, then, the Rivera parties’ common discovery ground was sought, ob-
tained, shifted, and obtained again. 
Another subsidiary opening stage arises on summary judgment. Under 
Rule 56(c) (and as detailed by local rules), both parties must submit, along with 
their summary judgment briefings, statements of undisputed and disputed facts 
based on the full discovery record.277 Typically, by local rule the moving party 
submits in numbered-paragraph form the facts that are undisputed with cita-
tions to the discovery record;278 the non-moving party responds by agreeing or 
disagreeing with what is undisputed, again with citations to the record.279 The 
parties in Rivera submitted these statements in connection with the defendants’ 
motion for partial summary judgment.280 The defendants attempted to set 
common evidentiary ground with twenty-six numbered paragraphs of “uncon-
troverted” factual assertions and 280 pages of exhibits.281 Mr. Rivera rejoined 
by conceding some of these facts—all of which he deemed non-material—
 
ments and Request for Admissions, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. June 24, 
2011), ECF No. 59; Plaintiff’s Motion Requesting Extension of Discovery Period at ¶ 4–6, 
Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. June 29, 2011), ECF No. 60; Informative 
Motion as to Mendez and Alvarez and Motion for Enlargement of Time as to HNK Ameri-
cas, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. July 17, 2012), ECF No. 65; Plaintiff’s 
Motion Announcing Experts and for Brief Extension at ¶ 2–4, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 
11-1530 (D.P.R. Sept. 21, 2012), ECF No. 70; Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and for Addi-
tional Extension at ¶ 6, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Oct. 23, 2012), ECF 
No. 73; Motion Requesting Additional Time to Plead, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 
(D.P.R. Apr. 19, 2013), ECF No. 88; Plaintiff’s Urgent Motion for Extension to File Dis-
positive Motion at ¶ 3–4, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Apr. 29, 2011), 
ECF No. 91. 
276  Minute Entry, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. June 5, 2013), ECF No. 
116. 
277  FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1) (“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed 
must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record. . . . ; or 
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine 
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.”). 
278  E.g., D.P.R. CIV. R. 56(b) (“A motion for summary judgment shall be supported by a 
separate, short, and concise statement of material facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs, as 
to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried. 
Each fact asserted in the statement shall be supported by a record citation . . . .”). 
279  In the case of the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, the non-moving party al-
so submits a statement of additional disputed facts, D.P.R. CIV. R. 56(c), to which the mov-
ing party must respond by agreeing or disagreeing on their disputed nature. D.P.R. CIV. R. 
56(d). 
280  Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 1, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 
11-1530 (D.P.R. Sept. 10, 2013), ECF No. 124. Interestingly, defendants founded this argu-
ment on a second stasis that they raised the same day: a motion to strike the plaintiff’s expert 
testimony regarding the value of his works and damages he had sustained. Defendants’ Mo-
tion to Strike Experts Felix Norman Roman & Ruben Alejandro Moreira, Rivera v. Méndez 
& Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Sept. 10, 2013), ECF No. 123. 
281  Statement of Uncontroverted Facts in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Sept. 10, 2013), ECF No. 125. 
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denying others, and adding disputed facts of his own.282 The lower right panel 
of Figure 1 depicts this process. The court was left to sift through these state-
ments for common evidentiary ground to consider in deciding the motion. But 
just as important, the parties’ competing statements allowed the court to see the 
full scope of their disagreement—the common ground for trial. 
What remains of the case following a summary judgment decision supplies 
the final subsidiary opening stage, which takes shape in the pretrial conference. 
In this conference, parties formulate a trial plan, agreeing as much as possible 
on what the trial should look like and how it should proceed. This agreement is 
usually embodied in a joint proposed pretrial order.283 To fill the contents of 
this proposed order, the parties discuss and agree on as much as possible re-
garding witnesses, evidence, and legal issues.284 In Rivera, all the parties signed 
on to a seventy-three-page “proposed pretrial order memorandum,” the contents 
of which included the following stated from both the plaintiff’s and the defend-
ants’ perspectives: a statement of the nature of the case, legal and factual con-
tentions, controverted and stipulated facts and admitted facts, lists of evidence 
and witnesses, the estimated trial length, and more.285 In effect, through the 
joint proposed order, the parties agree on some matters and further concur on 
their disagreements.286 
The extended opening stage of a lawsuit’s critical discussion, then, oper-
ates as a continuous examination of accord on the scope of the lawsuit, the 
method and manner of discovery, the facts and legal issues involved, and the 
content and presentation of the evidence at trial. The parties make these coop-
erative efforts even as they are fighting tooth and nail over disputed territory, 
which comprises the remaining stages of the critical discussion in a federal suit. 
2. Litigation Moves: Confrontation, Argument, and Concluding Stages 
Just as the Rules require cooperation, they anticipate and license arguments 
for dialectical presentation to and resolution by the judge. This section explains 
how the parties’ adversarial moves can be reconstructed as the remaining stages 
of the critical discussion. Those stages recur every time a party requests the 
resolution of a stasis. We define a stasis—consistently with its etymology—as a 
 
282  Opposing Statement of Contested Facts and Counter Statement of Facts in Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Sept. 26, 
2013), ECF No. 131. In fact, the plaintiff filed another document in this contest over the evi-
dence. Plaintiff’s Clarification of Facts & Opposing Statement of Additional Facts in Sup-
port of Response to Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., 
No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Oct. 21, 2013), ECF No. 149. 
283  D.P.R. LOCAL R. 16(d) (Dec. 3, 2009, with Amendments through Apr. 12, 2018). 
284  Id. 
285  Joint Proposed Pretrial Order Memorandum, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 
(D.P.R. Dec. 2, 2013), ECF No. 160. 
286  In this sense, the final pretrial order is not just a subsidiary opening stage but also poses 
standpoints that the judge or jury must resolve at trial. Joint Proposed Pretrial Order Memo-
randum, supra note 285. 
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stopping point, a point where the parties require the resolution of an issue be-
fore moving forward.287 In the next section, we differentiate among three types 
of litigation stases, but first we explain here how each stasis, no matter the type, 
is a packaged critical discussion comprising confrontation, argumentation, and 
concluding stages. The right side of Figure 1 depicts two examples. 
Each stasis begins with a confrontation, the point at which the parties real-
ize there is a difference of opinion that requires resolution.288 The Rules envi-
sion several types of confrontations, all of which involve one party notifying 
the judge and the other party about an issue that must be resolved.289 The most 
common confrontations are motions, which explicitly request a court ruling on 
a disputed matter.290 FRCP motions run the litigation gamut, from jurisdictional 
motions to other pre-answer motions challenging the complaint, to motions for 
sanctions, to discovery motions, to summary judgment motions, to post-trial 
motions.291 All of these motion types were filed in Rivera.292 Motions to join, 
interplead, intervene, or to implead parties are confrontations about the scope 
of the lawsuit, as are motions to amend the pleadings,293 such as the two Rivera 
motions seeking to add defendants. The Rules also permit all manner of admin-
istrative motions.294 The Rivera docket is replete with these: requests for con-
tinuances and extensions of time and for permission to exceed word limits and 
to file additional briefing.295 
Another type of confrontation happens when the parties submit disputed 
positions on a matter in response to a court order. For example, the discovery or 
trial items that remain in contention following a Rule 26(f) or Rule 16 confer-
ence must be presented to the judge for resolution in a Rule 16 order—whether 
of the interim or final pretrial variety.296 Likewise, Rivera included motions in 
limine to admit or exclude evidence pretrial, submitted pursuant to a pretrial 
order.297 Contested jury instructions, also submitted in Rivera, are required by 
 
287  See discussion supra note 12. 
288  VAN EEMEREN & GROOTENDORST, supra note 10, at 60. 
289  The arrows pointing from the upper to the lower portion of Figure 1 depict points in the 
Rivera suit where stases arose. 
290  See FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a), 78. 
291  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c), 12(b), 15(a), 26(g), 37(a), 37(e), 50(a)–(b), 56(a), 59. 
292  See generally Docket, supra note 233. 
293  FED. R. CIV. P. 14 (third party practice), 18–21 (joinder), 22 (interpleader), 24 (interven-
tion). 
294  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b), 7(b). 
295  See generally Docket, supra note 233. 
296  FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) (scheduling conference); (c), (d) (pretrial conference); (e) (final 
pretrial conference). 
297  See Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984) (discussing how motion in limine 
practice, though not governed explicitly by the Federal Rules of Evidence, has developed 
“pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of trials.”); Minute 
Entry, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Dec. 10, 2011), ECF No. 165 (Minute 
entry setting due date for motions in limine as December 11 for trial slated to begin Decem-
ber 17); Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Irrelevant Facts, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., 
20 NEV. L.J. 967 
1016 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20:3  
local rule to be submitted at least seven days before the trail starts, “unless oth-
erwise ordered by the Court.”298 Ultimately, the judge will rule on those and 
instruct the jury accordingly.299 Finally, the Rules license a host of confronta-
tions during the trial, including juror challenges, opening and closing argu-
ments, trial objections, offers of proof, and final jury instructions.300 
Every confrontation, whether by motion or submission, proceeds to the ar-
gumentation stage. Rule 78 explicitly authorizes motion arguments, empower-
ing the court to “establish regular times and places for oral hearings on mo-
tions” and “provide for submitting and determining motions on briefs . . . .”301 
Aside from Rule 78, local rules often specify methods for arguing motions.302 
Judges also use their discretionary powers to hear arguments on disputed sub-
mitted points during pretrial conferences and at trial. Here, the notion of mixed 
and non-mixed confrontations becomes relevant, for each involves a different 
argumentative stance.303 Sometimes, parties’ submissions stand unopposed, or 
are even submitted jointly to the court.304 In that situation, the dialectical argu-
ment is unorthodox, casting the judge as the opponent.305 Our review and anal-
ysis of the docket in Rivera, for example, revealed that the parties made fifty-
six motions. Of these, only sixteen were opposed by the other party; the others 
remained unopposed. Of those not opposed, the court granted (at least in part) 
twenty-seven (67.5 percent) of them, denying the other thirteen (32.5 percent). 
The lack of opposition to many stases, and the court’s decisions to deny the 
 
No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Dec. 11, 2013), ECF No. 166; Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Ex-
clude Plaintiff's Experts, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Dec. 11, 2013), ECF 
No. 167. 
298  See FED. R. CIV. P. 51; D.P.R. CIV. R. 51; Order, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 
(D.P.R. Dec. 13, 2013), ECF No. 174 (requiring parties to file jury instructions by December 
17); Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instructions, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. 
Dec. 16, 2013), ECF No. 185; Defendant’s Motion Submitting Proposed Jury Instructions, 
Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Dec. 17, 2013), ECF No. 189. 
299  See Jury Instructions, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Dec. 20, 2013), 
ECF No. 191. 
300  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 46 (objecting to a ruling or order), 47(b) (juror challenges), 
50(a) (permitting motion for judgment as a matter of law against a party after that party has 
closed its case). Defendants in Rivera moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of 
trial. Jury Trial Transcript at Dec. 19, 2013, 9:25, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 
(D.P.R. Jan. 16, 2014), ECF No. 212. 
301  FED. R. CIV. P. 78. 
302  See, e.g., D.P.R. LOCAL R. 7(b) (providing instructions for non-moving to oppose a mo-
tion in writing); D.P.R. LOCAL R. 7(c) (allowing the moving party to reply to the opposition); 
D.P.R. LOCAL R. 7(f) (providing for oral argument in some cases and determination solely on 
the memoranda in others). 
303  See supra text accompanying notes 77–87. 
304  The Rules do not require a non-moving party to oppose a motion. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
7(b). 
305  On the judge’s side, the argument resolving the stasis is likely to be unexpressed, as 
when the judge simply grants or denies the motion in a minute order without explaining her 
reasons. 
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motions presenting some stases, supports our view that litigation stases are of-
ten non-mixed differences of opinion.306 
On more significant stases, the argumentation stage proceeds as a dialecti-
cal discussion between the parties, by virtue of a supporting brief, an opposition 
brief, and a reply brief filed according to a judicially set briefing schedule—or 
more rarely, through oral presentations.307 In this stage the parties must ad-
vance rational contentions that a reasonable judge would find acceptable under 
the governing Rules. As a foundational matter, the parties must take rational 
stances supported by law and fact and relevant to the point being advanced, ar-
ticulate affirmative and responsive positions, and rely on generally accepted 
rhetorical appeals for legal argument, as any critically rationalistic argument 
would do.308 Aside from following these generally accepted legal argument 
conventions, for arguments to be considered rational and acceptable they must 
also stick to the scope of the motion or submission. Arguments on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion cannot debate the truth of the allegations; arguments on Rule 
11 motions cannot ask to sanction a complaint whose only fault is legal insuffi-
ciency; motions to compel cannot base their arguments on the moving party’s 
general cooperativeness; and motions for summary judgment cannot rely on 
disputed evidence.309 
The concluding stage for each stasis culminates in judicial rulings or or-
ders. Motions are resolved by rulings granting or denying them;310 jury instruc-
 
306  See supra text accompanying notes 77–87. 
307  See, e.g., D.P.R. CIV. R. 7. 
308  The Rules require as much. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (“By presenting . . . a . . . motion[] or 
other paper . . . an attorney . . . certifies that . . . the claims, defenses, and other legal conten-
tions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, 
or reversing existing law or for establishing new law . . . [and] the factual contentions have 
evidentiary support . . . .”). The advice of scholars is consistent on this point. See, e.g., 
SUSAN E. PROVENZANO ET AL., ADVANCED APPELLATE ADVOCACY 87–111, 205–10, 215–18, 
223–26, 249–53, 261–69 (2016) (delineating these bounds and rhetorical features of relevant 
and rational affirmative and responsive arguments in briefs); ROBIN WELLFORD SLOCUM, 
LEGAL REASONING, WRITING, AND OTHER LAWYERING SKILLS 379–96, 401–26, 431–46, 
449–55 (3d ed. 2011) (same); Mortimer Levitan, Confidential Chat on the Craft of Briefing, 
4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 305, 312–20 (2002) (describing these attributes of effective and 
persuasive arguments in federal court briefs); Richard A. Posner, From the Bench: Convinc-
ing a Federal Court of Appeals, 25 LITIGATION 3, 3(1999) (same). 
309  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2), (3), (4) (identifying sanctionable filings as those lacking 
evidentiary support or resting on frivolous legal contentions); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1) (re-
quiring motions to compel to be founded on an “evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or 
response” or a “failure to disclose, answer, or respond”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009) (requiring an assumption of truth for well-pled factual allegations); Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)(citations omitted) (stating that on summary 
judgment, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences 
are to be drawn in his favor.”). As we explain in Sections III.C and III.D infra, within these 
Rule parameters, the range of acceptable argument content can be constructed using the sec-
ond component of our model: our system of stases, argument dimensions, and topoi. 
310  FED. R. CIV. P. 7(b). 
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tions are likewise settled by judicial rulings, as are trial objections.311 Court or-
ders resolving submitted stases include scheduling-order determinations about 
the scope or methods of discovery.312 Final pretrial orders resolve stases about 
the presentation of evidence and conduct of trial;313 discovery orders resolve 
what information must be produced or protected from discovery;314 sanctions 
orders specify the punishment that befits a party’s misbehavior.315 The court 
may also enter larger-scale orders, such as an order for a new trial316 or for re-
lief from a judgment.317 
In the Rivera case, the plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery,318 represent-
ed in the upper right panel of Figure 1, illustrates how a stasis moves through 
these four critical discussion stages. The motion was preceded by an opening 
stage in which Mr. Rivera consulted with defendants’ counsel to resolve their 
discovery differences.319 He then filed the motion to compel, kicking off the 
confrontation stage by alerting the court to the parties’ unresolved dispute. The 
motion’s accompanying brief captured the argumentation stage, supporting the 
motion’s standpoint by contending that a defense witness had failed to provide 
information requested during a deposition.320 The defendants’ opposition 
brief321 dialectically opposed that standpoint, arguing that the witness had pro-
vided everything requested—and that plaintiff had either never requested or 
had no right to other documents.322 With that, the argumentation stage closed. 
The concluding stage took place during an in-chambers conference, where the 
parties resolved their differences, after which the judge denied the plaintiff’s 
motion as moot.323 
 
311  See FED. R. CIV. P. 51 (describing this jury instruction process); Wylie A. Aitken, Com-
ment, The Jury Instruction Process—Apathy or Aggressive Reform?, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 137, 
145 (1965) (explaining the jury instruction process as putting “the attorney in the role of the 
consultant. He recommends the instructions to the judge but the final responsibility for 
which instructions are given, and in what form, rest [sic] with the presiding judge.”). 
312  FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3). 
313  FED. R. CIV. P. 16(e). 
314  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (protective orders); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1), (5) (orders on motions 
to compel). 
315  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1), (4) (scope of permissible sanctions relating to non-discovery 
filings); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3) (scope of permissible sanctions relating to discovery fil-
ings). 
316  FED. R. CIV. P. 59. 
317  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
318  Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery at 1, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 
(D.P.R. Apr. 29, 2013), ECF No. 90.  
319  Id. 
320  Id. at 1–3 (claiming that the witness failed to respond after the deposition to questions 
raised during it). 
321  Opposition to Motion to Compel at 1, Rivera v. Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. 
May 9, 2013), ECF No. 94.  
322  Id. 
323  Minute Entry, supra note 276.  
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Apart from the conclusion of each stasis, a civil lawsuit always culminates 
in a concluding stage. The statistically most common and most encompassing 
conclusion is the type expressly envisioned by the PD critical-discussion 
framework: a full or partial settlement, which can happen at any time.324 An-
other large-scale conclusion of litigation stases is the dismissal of an action. 
This can take the form of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a voluntary or involuntary 
dismissal under Rule 41, or a disciplinary dismissal pursuant to discovery sanc-
tions.325 On the other side of the coin is judgment, including default judgment 
under Rule 55, summary judgment under Rule 56, or judgment as a matter of 
law under Rule 50.326 In a case that proceeds to a bench trial, the judge will is-
sue findings of fact and conclusions of law, resolving all remaining stases in 
one way or another,327 while a jury trial will result in a verdict converted to a 
judgment by the court.328 
This section has shown how the four-stage critical-discussion framework 
maps onto the stases in a lawsuit’s adversarial moves. This framework does 
not, however, identify the types of rational arguments that can be made at each 
stasis. For that, we turn to the second major component of our model—the sta-
ses themselves. 
C. Stases: Claim, Defense, and Procedure 
In Parts I and II, we concluded that classical stasis theory, viewed through 
the lens of Hohmann’s theory of argument dynamics, supplies the analytical 
content left open in the critical-discussion framework’s argumentation stage. 
The previous section showed that this stage happens at every civil procedure 
stasis, when the Rules permit the parties to stop and make adversarial moves. In 
the static component of our model, three elements work in a nested fashion to 
define the range of rational arguments that can be advanced in the argumenta-
tion stage: (1) the stases; (2) the dimensions of argument within the stases; and 
(3) the commonplace topics, or ‘topoi,’ of the arguments within each static di-
mension. 
We start by defining the stases. We depart from classical stasis theory and 
Hohmann’s conception of it by having three stases, each with two dimensions. 
 
324  See supra text accompanying note 100. In Rivera, for example, the parties settled after 
the defendants appealed the jury verdict in the plaintiff’s favor to the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals. Notice of Appeal, supra note 241, at 1; Amended Final Judgment at 1, Rivera v. 
Méndez & Co., No. 11-1530 (D.P.R. Nov. 6, 2014), ECF No. 244.  
325  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), 41. Regarding discovery sanctions, see FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c), 
(d), (e). 
326  The Rules also specify procedures for entering judgment and determining costs and fees. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 50, 54–58. And they provide for executing the judgment and determining 
and enforcing remedies. See FED. R. CIV. P. 64–65, 69–71. 
327  FED. R. CIV. P. 52. 
328  FED. R. CIV. P. 58(b). 
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In our model, a civil suit encompasses three stasis types, which correspond to a 
lawsuit’s three party designations. 
The first of these three stasis types, the claim stasis, occurs when the par-
ties have a difference of opinion about the legal harm for which the plaintiff 
seeks relief. For example, when the defendant files a 12(b)(6) motion or a Rule 
12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the defendant disputes the allega-
tions’ sufficiency and the claim’s ability to move forward to discovery.329 
When the defendant moves for summary judgment under Rule 56 or judgment 
as a matter of law (JMOL) under Rule 50, the defendant disputes the sufficien-
cy of the claim’s evidence and the need for a fact-finder.330 More rarely, the 
plaintiffs move for summary judgment or JMOL on their own claims, also dis-
puting the need for a fact-finder but for a different reason—that the evidence 
supports only one possible outcome: judgment in their favor.331 
Second, a defense stasis reflects a difference of opinion on the defendant’s 
justification or excuse from liability.332 The stopping points are similar to the 
claim stasis. The plaintiff may challenge a defense’s facial validity by moving 
to strike the defense under Rule 12(f).333 A plaintiff may conclusively dispute 
the existence of a valid defense by filing a motion for judgment on the plead-
ings if the defendant admits the operative allegations and neglects to plead a 
 
329  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (providing for defense motion for a complaint’s “failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted”); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) (providing for motion for 
judgment on the pleadings at the close of the pleading stage); Patrick M. Blanchard & Craig 
M. Sandberg, Winning Without Trial: Rule 12(c) Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings,  
A.B.A.: LITIGATION, (2007) (explaining that a Rule 12(c) motion “challenges the legal suffi-
ciency of the opposing party’s pleadings”); see, e.g., Motion to Dismiss Moral Right Claims 
Under VARA and the Puerto Rico Intellectual Property Law, supra note 261, at 2, 4–8. 
330  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (citations omitted) (stating 
that the summary judgment “standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under 
the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict”); Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (“[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates 
the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against 
a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essen-
tial to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”). 
331  See FED. R. CIV. P. 50, 56; see, e.g., Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, 20, 
Rivera v. Méndez & Co., 988 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D.P.R. 2013) (No. 11-01530), ECF No. 121. 
332  In this sense, a defense stasis resembles the classical stasis of quality. See supra text ac-
companying notes 142–59. 
333  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) (“The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense . . . 
on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a response is not 
allowed, within 21 days after being served with the pleading.”). “Motions to strike are 
viewed with disfavor and are not frequently granted.” Operating Eng’rs Local 324 Health 
Care Plan v. G & W Constr. Co., 783 F.3d 1045, 1050 (6th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). 
Nevertheless, “[a] motion to strike should be granted if ‘it appears to a certainty that plain-
tiffs would succeed despite any state of the facts which could be proved in support of the 
defense and are inferable from the pleadings.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). 
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defense.334 And a plaintiff may dispute the legal sufficiency of an affirmative 
defense in a motion for summary judgment or JMOL.335 
Third, and finally, a procedure stasis challenges the conduct of the case’s 
critical discussion, including where it should happen and whether a particular 
move is permitted or required. For example, a defendant may dispute the forum 
for hearing the case in a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter or personal 
jurisdiction.336 Parties may dispute their opponents’ ability to change the litiga-
tion’s scope in a motion to amend a pleading after the expiration of Rule 
15(a)’s deadline for amendments as a matter of course.337 Discovery motions to 
compel and for protective orders are likewise procedural stases about which 
documents must be produced or withheld, or which witnesses may be deposed 
about what and for how long.338 Because the Rules grant judges case manage-
ment discretion,339 these procedural stases focus more squarely on the court, 
which must manage the critical discussion consistently with the normative 
goals of civil procedure. 
It may appear that we have renamed one of the four classical stases, deleted 
two of them, and added one. As Figure 2 shows, however, we have retained all 
parts of the classical system, but in a way that fits the civil litigation mold. As 
the next section explains, our claim stasis combines the stases of definition and 
conjecture. Those stases were the basis for a lawsuit in classical times and, as 
Part II revealed, they undergird every other stasis. Our defense stasis resembles 
the classical stasis of quality, encompassing justifications and excuses. And we 
have kept the objection stasis as it was, merely renaming it. 
 
334  Blanchard & Sandberg, supra note 329 (noting that a plaintiff’s 12(c) motion can suc-
ceed when the “closed pleadings have a substantial likelihood of containing the entire rele-
vant universe of information,” which is the case if the defendant does not deny the operative 
allegations or raise an affirmative defense). 
335  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1) (giving the court the power to grant a motion for judgment 
as a matter of law against a party if a “reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient 
evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue”) (emphasis added); Jones v. Bock, 549 
U.S. 199, 204 (2007) (referring to an affirmative defense as a matter that the “defendant 
must plead and prove.”); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (stating that summary judgment may be 
entered against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 
an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of 
proof at trial.”) (emphasis added); Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 931 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(explaining that Rule 50 motions for judgment as a matter of law are the proper vehicle for 
challenging the sufficiency of an affirmative defense). 
336  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)–(2). 
337  FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). The defendants in Rivera did not do so when the plaintiff moved to 
amend the complaint. See supra text accompanying note 262. 
338  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (“A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may 
move for a protective order” including for matters related to depositions); FED. R. CIV. P. 
37(a)(3)(B) (“A party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, des-
ignation, production, or inspection.”). 
339  See supra text accompanying notes 36–41. 
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Having defined the stasis types in civil litigation, what remains is to con-
struct the argument stage content within those stases. The final sections accom-
plish this work with the next two static elements of our model: the dimensions 
and topoi of trans-substantive litigation arguments. 
D. Stasis Dimensions: Conjecture and Definition 
To construct the argumentation stage for each stasis, our model starts, as 
Hohmann’s theory did, by outlining argument dimensions—that is, the direc-
tional thrusts of an acceptable argument.340 As we saw in Part II, every stasis 
 
340  See supra text accompanying notes 203–06. 
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has precisely two dimensions or potential thrusts: conjecture and definition.341 
Those dimensions are obvious in the classical conjectural and definitional sta-
ses, but our analysis showed that even the classical stases of quality and proce-
dure rest on nested factual and definitional questions.342 Hohmann’s theory 
shows that the same is true of legal argument in general: to one degree or an-
other, legal arguments give way to factual (conjectural) and legal interpre-
tive/application (definitional) questions.343 So too, each stasis in a civil suit is 
grounded in assertions that (1) a set of operative facts exists, and (2) a legal 
standard calls for a certain outcome in the presence of those facts. 
As Figure 2 shows, these conjectural and definitional dimensions charac-
terize all the stases in our tripartite typology. A Rule 12(b)(6) claim stasis, for 
instance, targets operative factual allegations that must be assumed true (con-
jecture), and which must be judged against the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility 
pleading standard in light of the claim’s substantive legal requirements (defini-
tion).344 A summary judgment defense stasis testing an affirmative defense fo-
cuses on the discovery evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the de-
fendant—the universe of operative facts defined by Rule 56 (conjecture)—and 
argues that those facts fail the substantive law’s requirements for that defense 
(definition).345 A procedural stasis arguing for a protective order has as its fac-
tual basis some set of otherwise relevant confidential, private, or proprietary 
information or facts showing oppression (conjecture), to which is applied Rule 
26(c)’s “good cause” standard for shielding that information from discovery or 
for stopping the oppressive behavior (definition).346  
Even stases with standpoints that seem purely legal have conjectural and 
definitional dimensions. For instance, a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the 
pleadings may raise the purely legal question of whether a party is a state actor 
subject to First Amendment regulation (definition).347 But even that question is 
tethered to a fact set—the character of the actor as alleged in the pleadings and 
 
341  See supra text accompanying notes 155–61. 
342  See supra text accompanying notes 157–63. 
343  See supra Part II.C. These dimensions are not inherent to law; they characterize argu-
mentation in general. Legal argument is a subtype of argumentation that relies on modes of 
reasoning, both deductive and non-deductive types. See Larson, supra note 59, at 666–67, 
696–98. (proposing defeasible argumentation schemes as a model for non-deductive argu-
mentation in law). Stephen Toulmin’s model is frequently cited as illustrative of legal rea-
soning. Toulmin’s model requires a warrant legitimating the move from data to some claim. 
STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 93–94 (updated ed. 2003). In Toulmin’s 
model, the data is conjectural; the warrant is definitional; and the claim is the argumentative 
conclusion that follows. 
344  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, ac-
cepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see 
also supra note 251 for further discussion of this standard. 
345  See supra note 330 for further discussion of this standard. 
346  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
347  See supra note 329 explaining these standards for Rule 12(c). 
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admitted in the answer (conjecture). On the flip side, even fact-intensive proce-
dural stases, such as motions to compel under Rule 37(a), have a definitional 
dimension. In such motions, the parties may wrangle over the efforts the re-
sponding party did or did not make to produce the desired information (conjec-
ture).348 But to prevail, the motion must ultimately address that information’s 
legal relevance, or else it is not discoverable no matter how obstreperous the 
responding party’s conduct (definition). 
These conjectural and definitional dimensions are not self-substantiating; 
each needs its own “backing”349 or how-do-we-know proof. That backing must, 
in turn, have conjectural or definitional support or both. A 12(b)(6) motion 
must back its assertions concerning which factual allegations are and are not 
well pled (conjecture), and must substantiate with authority and explanation 
both the movant’s interpretation of plausibility and its application to the claim’s 
legal requirements (definition).350 Under Rule 56, the summary judgment mo-
vant needs backing for what evidence is and is not disputed (conjecture), as 
well as authority interpreting and applying the standards for summary judgment 
and substantive legal requirements for which the evidence is purportedly lack-
ing (definition).351 A Rule 26(c) protective order motion must explain why the 
facts sought to be shielded from discovery are, in fact, confidential, proprietary, 
or private or show oppression (conjecture).352 And the motion must explain and 
apply the authority substantiating the good cause that makes this otherwise rel-
evant information non-discoverable (definition).353 
Theoretically, every conjectural and definitional dimension in every stasis 
could devolve into more and more discrete conjectural and definitional dimen-
sions—in other words, “turtles all the way down.”354 But before the arguments 
disintegrate into infinite regressions, the final static element of our model—the 
topoi—steps in to fill the argumentative content. 
E. Topoi: Empirical, Conventional, and Value Based 
The topos element of our model forms our trans-substantive argument tax-
onomy. Derived from the classical topoi and Hohmann’s legal argument di-
mensions, our topoi consist of empirical, conventional, and value-based argu-
ments. Part II explained how each classical stasis embodied topoi or 
 
348  See supra note 309 explaining these standards for Rule 37(a)(1). 
349  TOULMIN, supra note 343, at 95–96. 
350  See supra note 329 explaining these standards for Rule 12(b)(6). 
351  See supra note 330 explaining these standards for Rule 56. 
352  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(A)–(H) (identifying these grounds for obtaining a protective or-
der). 
353  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (stating that a party must establish “good cause” on these 
grounds for the court to enter a protective order). 
354  David Gray Carlson, Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1908, 1927 n.129 (1999) (referring to the infinite regress problem). 
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commonplace arguments of these three types.355 In the context of legal argu-
mentation, Hohmann did as well, under the headings ‘operative,’ ‘regulative’ 
and ‘optative.’356 Our model has three topoi: Its empirical topos refers to argu-
ments grounded in observations about the world, including observations about 
factual events and legal texts, and rational inferences about them. Its conven-
tional topos refers to arguments that employ legal standards to categorize or in-
terpret facts or law in a certain manner. Its value-based topos covers arguments 
that appeal to underlying legal norms or real-world consequences, but within 
the constraints that our legal system imposes on such policy-oriented and emo-
tionally appealing arguments. 
These three topoi run parallel in each stasis’s conjectural and definitional 
dimensions. Empirical arguments address the direct experiences of the arguing 
parties, witnesses, and tribunal. Conventional arguments are abstractions that 
reflect rules of thumb, which may be more or less accurate. And finally, value-
based arguments call on even more abstract principles and concepts, making 
them more difficult to substantiate. Provisionally, we make the normative claim 
that empirical topoi are more rationally persuasive than conventional topoi, and 
that both are more rationally persuasive than value-based topoi. There is some 
evidence that our civil legal system shares this ranking, as we shall see in the 
coming subsections. 
What follows is an explanation of how each topos functions in each dimen-
sion to create a taxonomy of rational civil procedure arguments. We start with 
definitional-dimension arguments, which are much more common than conjec-
tural-dimension arguments because the Rules do not license true merits argu-
ments until trial.357 
1. Claim and Defense Stasis Topoi in the Definitional Dimension 
In a claim or defense stasis’s definitional dimension, empirical topoi are 
arguments about the observable content of authoritative legal texts.358 In our 
system of written opinions recording the common law, legislative bodies enact-
ing statutes, and administrative bodies issuing regulations, it is rare for parties 
to dispute whether an opinion, statute, or regulation exists.359 More typically, 
empirical arguments appear in the definitional realm when the parties debate 
linguistic meaning, particularly in litigation over statutes.360 As Hohmann ex-
 
355  See supra Part II.B.2. 
356  See supra Part II.C. 
357  See supra text accompanying notes 17–19. 
358  See Hohmann, supra note 15, at 183 (describing his “operative” dimension); supra text 
accompanying notes 179–81. 
359  The exception would be arguments that contend a law has been preempted, abrogated, or 
superseded based on established standards for interpreting legislative actions. Hohmann, su-
pra note 15, at 184. 
360  Id. at 185–89 (discussing these kinds of language-meaning arguments in the context of 
statutory interpretation).  
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plains, the sources of ordinary meaning—including assessing what words are 
used and dictionary definitions and other sources of ordinary meaning for those 
words—are actually questions of fact.361 The ongoing debate about which lexi-
cal sources to employ to which ends and which ones should trump others362 
makes the empirical topos relevant to any stasis that contests the meaning of a 
statute. 
In contrast to empirical arguments validating legal content, conventional 
arguments in the definitional dimension employ legal standards to interpret, 
categorize, and apply that content.363 In the case of a statute, conventional ar-
guments address “particular standards of meaning”364 using accepted interpre-
tive tools for clarifying ambiguous, contradictory, or impenetrable language. 
These conventional standards license inferences about meaning using canons of 
construction and by deeming relevant the interpretive context of the statutory 
scheme, statutes with parallel language, statements of purpose, and legislative 
history.365 Conventional definitional arguments interpreting judicial opinions 
rely on accepted modes of legal reasoning for extracting legal rules and defini-
tions from opinion text and for using legal opinions as examples in legal analo-
gies.366  
In the definitional dimension, interpretation leads to application. Here, 
conventional definitional arguments take the rule that the parties have interpret-
ed or categorized, and dispute whether it covers the situation at hand.367 Such 
arguments not only draw on the terms of the legal rule to debate whether and 
how it applies to the facts, but also draw on conventional methods of law-fact 
application reasoning.368 Those reasoning methods include characterizing fact 
sets at higher or lower levels of abstraction to fit or fail the rule, applying broad 
or narrow interpretations of the rule, and reasoning by analogy, among oth-
 
361  Hohmann explains, “[t]he existence of such an understanding is itself a question of fact 
and thus potentially subject to further discussion: we may be able to distinguish different di-
mensions of usage, debate in turn how these can be verified and how they interact, and 
which of them should prevail, in the sense of being regarded as ‘the’ usage, if they conflict, 
etc.” Id. at 185. 
362  See Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: 
The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 242–44 
(1999). In recent years, scholars have debated the role of corpus linguistics in interpreting 
legal texts, especially the U.S. Constitution. See Larson, supra note 59, at 679 n.79. 
363  See Hohmann, supra note 15, at 183–84 (discussing his “regulative” dimension). 
364  Id. at 185. 
365  PROVENZANO ET AL., supra note 308, at 100–01 (discussing these methods of statutory 
interpretation). 
366  See id. at 90–91 (discussing these methods of interpreting and formulating arguments 
based on judicial opinions); Larson, supra note 59, at 701–03. 
367  See Hohmann, supra note 15, at 186. 
368  See PROVENZANO ET AL., supra note 308, at 97 (discussing the nature and construction of 
law-fact application arguments). 
20 NEV. L.J. 967 
Spring 2020] CIVIL PROCEDURE 1027 
ers.369 Finally, value-based definitional arguments contend that the rule’s ani-
mating norms—the reason for its existence—would be furthered or hindered by 
applying it one way or the other. Such arguments may also appeal to favorable 
or unfavorable anticipated real-world consequences that would follow from the 
facts being deemed to meet or fail the rule.370 
In civil procedure, the classic embodiment of arguments on a claim stasis’s 
definitional dimension is the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which investigates the legal 
nature of a set of allegations to determine whether they state a cognizable legal 
wrong.371 Consider a well-known case in which a plaintiff sued his employer 
and high-ranking executives for terminating him because he testified in a fraud 
prosecution against the employer.372 The plaintiff in Haddle v. Garrison chal-
lenged his termination by bringing state law claims and a federal retaliation 
claim under a Civil War era statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2).373 The complaint al-
leged that the defendants violated the federal statute’s prohibition against con-
spiracies that “deter” a person’s anticipated court testimony or “injure” some-
one “in his person or property” because of his actual court testimony.374 The 
case proceeded all the way to the Supreme Court on the definitional dimension 
of a claim stasis.375  
Seeking to dismiss the Section 1985(2) claim, the defendants advanced the 
empirical definitional argument that there is no legal remedy for this form of 
retaliation, because the plaintiff was employed at will, and this law did not 
reach at-will terminations of any kind.376 Defendants also made a conventional 
definitional argument using circuit authority that limits injuries “in his . . . 
property” to constitutionally protected employment interests.377 As an at-will 
 
369  See PROVENZANO ET AL., supra note 308, 97 (discussing the levels of abstraction used to 
build law-fact application arguments); Larson, supra note 59, at 701–04 (describing an “ar-
gumentation scheme” for constructing and assessing legal analogies). 
370  See Margolis, supra note 229, at 71–74, 77–78 (discussing consequences in several cate-
gories: judicial administration, institutional competence, and economics). 
371  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
372  Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 122 (1998). 
373  Id. at 122, 124. 
374  Id. at 123, 125 (“We disagree with the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that petitioner must 
suffer an injury to a ‘constitutionally protected property interest’ to state a claim for damages 
under § 1985(2).”). 
375  The exemplars that follow are simplified versions of the parties’ arguments. 
376  Brief on the Merits of Respondents at 27–30, Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121 (1998) 
(No. 97-1472), (1998) WL 552375, at *27–30. Significantly, the Conley v. Gibson “beyond 
doubt no set of facts” dismissal standard governed at the time. 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957) 
(articulating the “accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 
his claim which would entitle him to relief.”). As a result, this empirical argument implied 
that there were no facts consistent with the complaint that could be alleged to constitute a 
harm cognizable under section 1985(2). 
377  Brief on the Merits of Respondents, supra note 376, at 37–41; see also Morast v. Lance, 
807 F.2d 926, 930 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[T]o make out a cause of action under § 1985(2) the 
plaintiff must have suffered an actual injury. Because Morast was an at will employee, he 
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employee, plaintiff had no such interest.378 The plaintiff responded with the 
conventional argument that a circuit split on this issue made the time ripe to re-
visit circuit precedent.379 Further, the plaintiff made a combined empirical and 
conventional argument about the relevant statutory language, emphasizing the 
need to consider the full phrase “in his person or property,” which, as an inter-
pretive matter, referred to any tortious injury, not just a constitutionally pro-
tected interest.380  
Because Haddle was litigated before the Iqbal and Twombly era, the de-
fendants did not raise conventional arguments about the plausibility standard.381 
But after these decisions, they might have. That is because the complaint relied 
primarily on timing to link the plaintiff’s testimony to his termination, and the 
timing was not especially close.382 As a result, post-Iqbal, the defendants could 
have made the conventional argument that the well-pled timing facts did not 
reasonably suggest a retaliatory termination, leaving only conclusory allega-
tions of motive, which are ignored in the plausibility analysis.383 We expect 
plaintiff would doubtless have both disputed the conventional characterization 
of his allegations as conclusory and contended that the well-pled facts, viewed 
in the light most favorable to him, reasonably suggested retaliatory intent. 
The parties also waged the definitional battle on value-based grounds. The 
statute’s original objective was to protect newly freed, previously enslaved per-
sons from those who would conspire to harm them or to destroy their property 
in retaliation for their actual or anticipated testimony against those flouting civ-
il rights laws.384 According to the defendants, applying the law to at-will em-
ployment terminations, without any allegations of race discrimination and out-
side of this historical context, would expand the law far beyond its original 
aims.385 The plaintiff responded in part with the conventional interpretive ar-
 
had no constitutionally protected interest in continued employment. Therefore, Morast’s dis-
charge did not constitute an actual injury under this statute.”) (internal citations omitted). 
378  Morast, 807 F.2d at 930; Brief on the Merits of Respondents, supra note 376, at 37–39. 
379  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10, 15, Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121 (1998) (No. 
97-1472). 
380  Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 17–25, Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121 (1998) (No. 
97-1472), 1998 WL 425991, at *17–25. 
381  See Brief on the Merits of Respondents, supra note 375, at 9, 41, 43. 
382  Complaint at 10–11, Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121 (1998) (No. CV 196029) (alleg-
ing that three-and-a-half-month time span between Haddle’s grand jury testimony and his 
termination supported retaliatory discharge in violation of section 1985(2)). 
383  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680–81 (2009) (concluding that allegations of the 
involvement of certain officials in enacting a policy did not by itself support a claim that 
their intent was discriminatory or that mere coincidence, without evidence supporting a dis-
criminatory intent as opposed to a non-discriminatory one, would not support the complaint). 
384  Indeed, the statute was enacted as a provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also 
known as the ‘Ku Klux Klan Act.’ United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 835 
(1983) (noting the main purpose of the act was to protect African Americans in the South 
and white northerners working to advance their interests from attacks by the Klan); id. at 839 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referring to “Ku Klux Klan Act”). 
385  Brief on the Merits of Respondents, supra note 375, at 26. 
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gument that Section 1985(2)’s language imposed no such limitations, but also 
by arguing the value-based point that plaintiff’s interpretation advanced the 
statute’s broader goal of dissuading interference with federal legal processes.386 
These same topoi can be raised in a defense-stasis definitional dimension; 
for example, a defendant’s summary judgment motion on its affirmative de-
fense of exhaustion of remedies can yield empirical, conventional, and value-
based arguments. So, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Bock, 
failure to exhaust prison grievance remedies must be raised as an affirmative 
defense in prisoner litigation suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.387 If a de-
fendant omitted this defense from the answer but raised it for the first time on a 
summary judgment motion requesting judgment on that defense, the defendant 
would be subject to the plaintiff’s waiver arguments (along with arguments that 
the discovery evidence on exhaustion is not decisive as a matter of law).388 To 
at least a degree, waiver is an empirical definitional question—did the defend-
ant’s answer actually plead what constitutes the legal defense of exhaustion? If 
not, then waiver becomes a conventional definitional debate over whether the 
defendant waited too long to raise the defense, based on judicial interpretations 
of the type of delay that operates as a waiver.389 On the plaintiff’s side, value-
based definitional arguments could draw on the normative goals of waiver—
getting fair notice of defenses, avoiding prejudice, and honoring repose.390 On 
the defense side, value-based arguments could raise the competing considera-
tions of full and fair merits decisions and the consequences of treating too light-
ly Congress’s strict exhaustion requirement in the Prisoner Litigation Reform 
Act.391 
 
386  Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 380, at 14–15, 24–25. 
387  Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007). 
388  See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state 
any avoidance or affirmative defense . . . .”) (emphasis added); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Henricks v. Pickaway Correctional Inst., 782 F.3d 744, 752 
(6th Cir. 2015) (raising waiver argument based on defendants’ failure to plead exhaustion as 
an affirmative defense in its answer); supra note 278 for summary judgment standard. 
389  See, e.g., Henricks, 782 F.3d at 751 (upholding defendants’ waiver of an affirmative de-
fense based on the prejudice that resulted from the defendant’s failure to raise the defense in 
its answer: “When the defendant is unable to offer any reasonable explanation for its tardi-
ness in presenting a defense, finding waiver is not an abuse of discretion.”); see also 2 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE–CIVIL § 8.08[2]–[3]. 
390  See Jarod S. Gonzalez, A Tale of Two Waivers: Waiver of the Jury Waiver Defense Un-
der the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 87 NEB. L. REV. 675, 705 (2009) (discussing these 
animating principles in courts’ decisions on waiver of affirmative defenses, including “the 
amount of the delay, the reason for the delay, and the surprise and prejudice the opposing 
party has suffered due to the failure to timely plead.”). 
391  See Jones, 549 U.S. at 202–03 (“In an effort to address the large number of prisoner 
complaints filed in federal court, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
. . . .” “Prisoner litigation continues to ‘account for an outsized share of filings’ in federal 
district courts.” “What this country needs, Congress decided, is fewer and better prisoner 
suits.”) (citations omitted). Notably, the fact that each stasis is focused on one party does not 
mean that the others cannot invoke it: in the Haddle example the defendant invoked a claim 
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These are but two examples of how claim and defense stases generate a 
three-way argument taxonomy along the definitional dimension. The same top-
oi would characterize any claim or defense stasis that turns on a question of in-
terpreting or applying a legal standard. 
2. Claim and Defense Stasis Topoi in the Conjectural Dimension 
In the conjectural dimension, empirical, conventional, and value-based 
topoi argue questions of fact—facts about what happened, who did it, and why. 
Empirical arguments in the conjectural dimension of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
may, for instance, debate which facts are and are not alleged in the complaint, 
in an effort to discern what must be assumed true, and the inferences that one 
can draw from them using logical reasoning.392 Conventional arguments, which 
employ legal standards to categorize facts, would center on the range of infer-
ences supported by those facts that legal standards license. Value-based argu-
ments would not play a role here because our system does not permit disregard-
ing empirically or conventionally determined facts in the name of some higher 
value.393 A similar set of topoi would characterize summary judgment argu-
ments, but with a different factual universe. Empirical arguments would contest 
what evidence is or is not in the discovery record; conventional arguments 
would contest the inferences reasonably drawn from that evidence. 
But in its purest form, the conjectural dimension of a claim or defense sta-
sis surfaces at trial, where the facts are finally determined subject to burdens of 
proof. After all the evidence has been submitted, the Rules license the advo-
cates, for the first time, to argue what happened, who did it, and why in closing 
arguments.394 Here, too, the topoi are empirical, conventional, and value based. 
Empirically, the plaintiff’s attorney may explain how the trial evidence “points 
in the direction” of an important factual conclusion.395 Perhaps four witnesses 
observed the same event and had consistent accounts, while no other witness 
contradicted these accounts. In contrast, the defense attorney may argue that the 
observable phenomena addressed by witnesses and documents support the op-
 
stasis, and in the exhaustion example the defendant would invoke a defense stasis. See supra 
text accompanying notes 375–77, 386–88. 
392  See supra note 329 (explaining these standards for Rule 12(b)(6)). 
393  See Hohmann, supra note 15, at 182–83. 
394  See supra notes text accompanying notes 71–74 (highlighting how, under the FRCP, ar-
gument should proceed to a well-founded conclusion). Although the FRCP do not explicitly 
address closing arguments, the United States Courts website offers practitioners an educa-
tional resource titled “Guide to Writing Closing Arguments.” It states that the purpose of 
closing argument is “[t]o persuade the jurors to adopt your view of the significance of the 
evidence and your view of the case,” and emphasizes that “[a]ttorneys are free to argue the 
merits of their case” at this juncture. Guide to Writing Closing Arguments, U.S. COURTS, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-ou 
treach/activity-resources/guide [https://perma.cc/ZH34-QEY9] (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).  
395  Hohmann, supra note 15, at 180. 
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posite factual conclusion—perhaps a document establishes the time, place, and 
occurrence of an event that no witness has contradicted. 
Threaded into these empirical assertions will be conventional arguments 
about the credibility and weight of the evidence based on evidentiary rules and 
conventional inferences from human behavior.396 For example, a party’s clos-
ing argument may contend that a witness cannot be believed because of her 
past criminal record, because she has a motive to lie, or because she acted im-
probably under the circumstances, suggesting her account should be disregard-
ed.397 A party may also contend that a witness’s poor perception devalues his 
testimony, that he is making his own strained and unreasonable inferences from 
the facts, or that he was too unfamiliar with the events to give credible testimo-
ny about them.398 Presumptions,399 too, are conventional conjectural arguments 
that can be used in summation. So, for example, in the absence of contrary evi-
dence, a closing argument may rely on the presumption that a properly mailed 
letter was received, that a design defect existed at the time of purchase based on 
its quick discovery, or that a party was of sound mind when he signed a con-
tract.400 
Value-based arguments along the conjectural dimension are rare in summa-
tion, just as they are in pretrial claim and defense stases. Although a closing ar-
gument can fashion an evidence-based narrative, designed to arouse emotions 
and to appeal to the jury’s sense of justice, ethical and evidentiary rules sharply 
constrain such appeals. Lawyers are not permitted to ask the jury to send a 
message to a large corporation that can afford a judgment; they cannot ask the 
jury to punish a defendant because he is an unrepentant liar; they cannot ask 
jurors to draw on extra-legal moral or religious beliefs in coming to a verdict; 
 
396  See, e.g., James H. Seckinger, Closing Argument, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 51, 58, 60–61 
(1995) (discussing the importance of arguing inferences, witness credibility, and burdens of 
proof in closing arguments); J. Alexander Tanford, Closing Argument Procedure, 10 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 47, 52–56 (1986), (discussing permissible credibility and evidentiary weight 
contentions permissible in closing argument). 
397  See FED. R. EVID. 609 (stating the rules for “attacking a witness’s character for truthful-
ness by evidence of a criminal conviction”); Seckinger, supra note 396, at 63–66 (offering 
examples of closing arguments making these points). 
398  See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 342 (1933) (directing a 
verdict in favor of the defendant in a wrongful death case when the plaintiff’s sole witness 
speculated upon his own perception of the facts, when he had not been in a good position to 
see the accident, rendering his testimony “suspicious, insubstantial[,] and insufficient”); id. 
at 336–37 (citing majority opinion reversed below, which contended that problems with vis-
ual perception or an opportunity to observe are credibility questions properly decided by and 
argued to a jury). 
399  A presumption is an evidentiary rule that compels the finding of a fact when a subset of 
more discrete facts has been proven and there is no contradictory evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 
301 (discussing the evidentiary effect of presumptions in civil cases); J. Clinton Kelly, Note, 
Presumptions in Civil Cases: Procedural Effects Under Maryland Law in State and Federal 
Forums, 5 U. BALT. L. Rev. 299, 303 (1976) (stating that such a lack of contradiction re-
lieves the party of the usual preponderance burden of proof). 
400  See Kelly, supra note 399, at 303–05 (discussing these presumptions). 
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they cannot encourage jurors to act on their own bigotry.401 On the other hand, 
a motion for a new trial asserting that a verdict was against the weight of the 
evidence licenses a conjectural value-based argument of sorts. A plaintiff who 
challenges a defense verdict on this ground may contend that the number, 
quality, and gravitas of her witnesses and documents were so overwhelming 
that a verdict for the defendant amounts to a serious miscarriage of justice,402 
requiring a do-over with a new fact-finding crew. 
In sum, the conjectural dimension of claim and defense stases raises the 
same three topoi that inhabit the definitional dimension. The conjectural topoi 
isolate questions of fact while the definitional topoi interpret and apply the law. 
The final stasis—the procedural type—encompasses the same three topoi along 
the same two dimensions. 
3. Procedural Stasis Topoi in the Conjectural and Definitional 
Dimensions 
In contrast to claim and defense stases, the conjectural dimensions of 
which are constrained until trial,403 procedural stases can raise and determine 
factual questions along the way. As a result, the procedural stasis’s conjectural 
dimension appears more frequently than it does in claim or defense stases. And 
when it does, all three topoi come into play. Consider the conjectural dimension 
of a procedural stasis raised on a Rule 37(a) motion to compel the production of 
documents. Empirically, the parties may debate the responding party’s produc-
tion efforts: Which files were checked? Which witnesses were interviewed 
about documents in their possession? What was produced and what was not 
produced?404 Conventionally, the parties may dispute whether those efforts can 
be categorized as sufficient or insufficient given the factual context. Perhaps 
the responding party overlooked an obvious file or witness under the circum-
stances, or engaged in a cursory review not befitting the request’s demands.405 
 
401  See Seckinger, supra note 396, at 73 (discussing these rule-breaking closing argument 
contentions); Tanford, supra note 396, at 93 tbl. 2 (same). 
402  Lind v. Schenley Indus., 278 F.2d 79, 89 (3d Cir. 1960) (citations omitted). 
403  See supra text accompanying note 394. 
404  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a), (b) (identifying these document production obligations 
for responding parties); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a), (c), (d) (identifying sanctions for failures to 
produce documents or to respond to discovery requests); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 
229 F.R.D. 422, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (imposing sanctions for counsel and parties’ failure to 
thoroughly inspect their own documents for production). 
405  These arguments about the adequacy of the responding party’s efforts will stay in the 
conjectural dimension unless and until they interpret or apply a legal definition. Here, the 
arguments would shift to the definitional dimension if the responding party’s efforts impli-
cated a Rule 26(b) definition that, for example, the efforts were adequate in light of the re-
quest’s burdensome, cumulative, or duplicative nature. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). They would 
also shift to the definitional realm if prior precedent addressed a similar “failure” to produce 
and branded it sufficient or insufficient. See, e.g., Zoobuh, Inc. v. Better Broadcast., LLC, 
No. 2:11-cv-00516 DN, 2017 WL 1476135, at *4-*5 (D. Utah Apr. 24, 2017) (defendant 
failed to provide “some quantification . . . of the material in its possession that [was] respon-
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As with the claim and defense stases, the value-based topos in this dimension is 
virtually non-existent: facts empirically or conventionally determined cannot be 
discarded on policy grounds. 
The same motion to compel has a definitional dimension as well. But in-
stead of debating what was and was not reviewed and produced and the quality 
of those efforts, the definitional dimension would interpret and apply Rule 
26(b)(1) and (2)’s scope of discovery standards, filtered through substantive 
legal requirements.406 Empirically speaking, the parties cannot debate the exist-
ence of these discovery rules or the words contained in them. And they would 
rarely, if ever, debate at this juncture the existence of a substantive law support-
ing a document request.407 But the parties may empirically debate the ordinary 
meaning of words that have yet to be judicially defined—for example, the new 
language in Rule 26(b)(1)’s proportionality standard.408 If, on the other hand, 
these standards have been accorded a common-law interpretation, then such in-
terpretive arguments would be conventional rather than empirical. As a defini-
tional matter, the motion to compel may also make conventional arguments 
about whether the desired information is “relevant” under Rule 26(b)(1).409 
Those arguments would interpret and apply the requirements of the substantive 
law driving the document request, debating whether the documents would tend 
 
sive” and thus failed to establish undue burden); Scott Hutchison Enter. v. Cranberry Pipe-
line Corp., No. 3:15-cv-13415, 2016 WL 5219633, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Sept. 20, 2016) (col-
lection of cases that require specific proof); Fish v. Kobach, No. 16-2105-JAR-JPO, 2016 
WL 893787, at *1 (D. Kan. Mar. 8, 2016) (“Objections based on undue burden must be 
clearly supported by an affidavit or other evidentiary proof of the time or expense involved 
in responding to the discovery request.”); McKinney/Pearl Rest. Partners v. Metro. Life Ins. 
Co., 322 F.R.D. 235, 242 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016) (“party resisting discovery must show 
how the requested discovery was overly broad, burdensome, or oppressive by submitting 
affidavits or offering evidence revealing the nature of the burden.”). 
406  See infra notes 408–11. 
407  See supra text accompanying note 359. 
408  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (permitting discovery that is “proportional to the needs of the 
case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controver-
sy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance 
of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit . . . .”). A version of this language previously appeared 
in FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)’s provision for making motions to limit discovery on 
grounds of disproportionality. By moving the language into the “scope” provision, the Rule 
now incorporates proportionality as an affirmative duty to consider in making discovery re-
quests. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (2015 Amendment). Courts have already begun ascribing meaning 
to this language. See, e.g., Abbott v. Wyoming Cty. Sheriff’s Office, No. 15-CV-531W, 
2017 WL 2115381, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017) (considering under proportionality 
whether discovery production has reached a point of diminishing returns); Alaska Elec. Pen-
sion Fund v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 14-CV-7126 (JMF), 2016 WL 6779901, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2016) (“Rule 26(b)(1)’s proportionality requirement means [that a doc-
ument’s] ‘marginal utility’ must also be considered.”) (citations omitted). 
409  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (stating in its first clause on the scope of discovery, that 
“[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any 
party’s claim or defense . . . .”). 
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to prove or disprove one of those requirements.410 Value-based definitional ar-
guments, in turn, might buttress a party’s empirical and conventional arguments 
with appeals to the discovery rules’ underlying norms. For instance, the moving 
party might appeal to the Rules’ wide-open discovery philosophy, while the re-
sponding party may cast the movant’s request as a “fishing expedition” that 
runs counter to the FRCP’s distaste for gamesmanship and inefficiency.411 
This section has explained how the three topoi—empirical, conventional, 
and value based—represent the range of rational civil procedure argument 
types. This range holds whether the parties are haggling over a claim, a de-
fense, or a point of procedure, or whether the parties are contesting factual or 
legal questions within those contexts. But this section’s illustrations are just the 
beginning. In future work, we will examine how the topoi hold up in the mine-
run of civil cases. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
This Article accounts for the contemporary civil suit as a staged critical 
discussion designed to reach a rational resolution of the parties’ differences of 
opinion. It classifies the argumentation within this discussion under three sta-
ses: claim, defense, and procedure, each having conjectural and definitional 
dimensions. Within these dimensions lies a taxonomy of acceptable argu-
ments—empirical, conventional, and value based—that can be used to promote 
rational outcomes across cases of all types. Now, given the theoretical roots and 
trunk of this critical discussion-stasis model, what other fruits might it bear? In 
other words, what can we do now that we could not do before? At present, we 
offer three possibilities. 
First, our model provides a descriptive vocabulary and normative frame-
work for assessing legal dispute-resolution mechanisms as systems for argu-
mentation. As the Rivera case shows, the model can fit the data. Potential next 
moves include a more searching application of the model to civil cases, and to 
other procedural regimes such as the rules of evidence and arbitral systems, 
both domestic and international. We anticipate making normative claims about 
these systems’ argumentative efficacy as a result. 
Second, with continued development, we hope our model will shed light on 
pressing procedural debates. For example, our treatment of the conjectural and 
definitional stases brings to mind the long-standing debates about the line, if 
 
410  See, e.g., Rengifo v. Erevos Enters., No. 06 Civ. 4266(SHS)(RLE), 2007 WL 894376, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2007) (finding irrelevant as not bearing on plaintiff’s Fair Labor 
Standards Act claim defendants’ request for plaintiff’s tax return); Favale v. Roman Catholic 
Diocese of Bridgeport, 233 F.R.D. 243, 245–47 (D. Conn. Nov. 8, 2005) (refusing to allow 
production of documents or deposition testimony that would not tend to prove or disprove 
negligent retention and supervision claims). 
411  See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 
1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 702–06 (1998) (discussing these com-
peting tensions). 
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any, between questions of fact and questions of law.412 For now, we observe 
that the speech-act theoretic components of pragma-dialectics may support an 
ontological distinction between them notwithstanding the many thoughtful 
scholarly views to the contrary.413 
Third, we expect our model to generate richer theories about arguments 
across legal domains. For example, the normative hierarchy among our topoi 
resembles the “hierarchy of interpretation methods”414 described by Professors 
MacCormick and Summers in their comparative study of statutory interpreta-
tion methods around the world.415 Although it remains to be seen, we expect 
that insights about the rationally persuasive effects of these topoi should carry 
across this domain and others. 
 
 
412  Indeed, Toulmin notes the similarity when describing his model. TOULMIN, supra note 
343, at 92. 
413  Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1769, 1770 (2003); see also Cook, supra note 17, at 417 (“[T]here is no logical distinc-
tion between statements which are grouped by the courts under the phrases ‘statements of 
fact’ and ‘conclusions of law.’ ”). 
414  Feteris, Patterns, supra note 43, at 63. 
415  D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers, Interpretation and Justification, in 
INTERPRETING STATUTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 511, 512–14 (D. Neil MacCormick & 
Robert S. Summers eds., 1991); see also Fetereis, Patterns, supra note 43, at 63. MacCor-
mick and Summers proposed such a hierarchy of argument types: “Linguistic arguments,” 
those based on the meanings of the actual words used in a statute; “systemic arguments,” 
including arguments based on “contextual-harmonization,” precedent, and analogy; and “tel-
eological/evaluative arguments,” including arguments about legislative purpose. MacCor-
mick & Summers, supra, at 512–15. 
